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ABSTRACT 
In April 2005 the Civil Union Act 2004 and the Relationships (Statutory 
References) Act 2005 came into force, creating the new institution of civil unions 
and providing same-sex couples with the option of having their relationship 
legally registered. In enacting this legislation, the Government purported to be 
creating a positive human rights culture by removing all discrimination in the law 
that was based on sexual orientation. The primary purpose of this paper is to 
examine the effectiveness of civil unions in fulfilling this human rights aim. In 
order to do this, the paper considers what is meant by the concept of 
discrimination as well as the corresponding right to equality, and ultimately 
advocates the application in New Zealand of the substantive equality model that 
has emerged out of Canadian jurisprudence. It is then argued that overseas 
developments warrant revision of the majority decision of the Court of Appeal in 
Quilter, and that the a New Zealand Court would feel compelled to find that the 
prohibition on same-sex marriage was discrimination per se because it denigrates 
same-sex relationships. Having come to this conclusion, the paper considers the 
effect of civil unions in remedying this affront to dignity by applying the 
Canadian substantive equality model. It is concluded that the creation of a 
separate but equal institution does not go far enough to eliminate the prima facie 
discrimination that exists under the Marriage Act 1955. Finally, a potential 
justification under section 5 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 is 
considered and dismissed. It is concluded that notwithstanding the creation of 
civil unions, maintaining a prohibition of same-sex marriage is an affront to the 
dignity of same sex couples. 
The text of this paper is approximately 15, 500 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
"Discrimination is unacceptable in a democratic society because it epitomises 
the worst effects of the denial of equality, and discrimination reinforced by law is 
particularly repugnant. The worst oppression will result from discriminatory 
measures having the force of law." 1 Throughout history, homosexual couples as 
well as homosexual individuals have suffered immensely as a result of 
discrimination.2 This discrimination has not been limited to social prejudice, but 
has frequently been perpetuated through provisions of the law. Under section 19 
of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA), however, the 
government has an obligation to ensure the right to freedom from discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation under New Zealand law. 3 
In 2004 the New Zealand Government introduced legislation into the 
House that was intended to finally rid the country of any legal discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation. This goal was to be achieved by way of a two 
step process. The Civil Union Act 2004 (CUA) was to provide the vehicle 
through which same-sex couples could officially register their relationship, 
whilst the Relationships (Statutory References) Act 2005 (RSRA) was to confer 
on civil union partners the equivalent rights and obligations as married couples. 
The intention of this paper is to assess the effectiveness of these two pieces of 
legislation in achieving this objective and ultimately determine whether civil 
unions are an adequate policy alternative to same-sex marriage. 
1 Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia [ I 989) 1 SCR 143, 172 (SCC) McIntyre J. 2 Halpern v Canada (AG) (2003) 225 DLR (4th) 529 (Ont CA). 
3 See page 9 for the text of section 19. 
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The paper begins by traversing the legal progression that resulted in the 
conception of civil unions, and explains the policy background to the enactment 
of the CUA and RSRA. It will be illustrated that one of the primary motivations 
driving the creation of the new institution was to fulfil human rights imperatives 
by removing any potential discrimination under the current law on the ground of 
sexual orientation. 
It will then be considered what is meant by the nebulous concept of 
discrimination, and how New Zealand courts could be guided by the developed 
Canadian jurisprudence in the application of that concept given the immaturity of 
our jurisprudence. After outlining the importance of upholding equality from 
both human rights and social policy perspectives, there will follow a discussion 
of the role of discrimination in the context of the same-sex marriage debate. It 
will be illustrated that since the Quilter v Attorney-Genera (Quilter y' decision, in 
which the majority concluded that the prohibition on same-sex marriage did not 
constitute discrimination, foreign jurisdictions have increasingly diverged from 
the approach that was taken by the court. It will be argued that these 
developments would warrant an entirely fresh look at the issue if it once again 
came before a New Zealand court, notwithstanding the enactment of the CUA 
and the RSRA. 
Having reached this conclusion, the paper will then assess the 
significance that civil unions have on the discrimination analysis. This analysis 
will employ the Canadian substantive equality model, and leads to the conclusion 
4 
Quilter v Attorney-General [ 1998) I NZLR 523 (CA). 
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that the creation of a 'separate but equal' institution does not remedy the affront 
to dignity caused by the distinction drawn under the Marriage Act (MA). The 
final section of the paper considers whether or not this prima facie discrimination 
can be cured by a justification under section 5 of the NZBORA. 
It will be concluded that although there are positive aspects to civil 
unions, the government has been unsuccessful in achieving its stated policy goals. 
Civil unions do not go far enough to remedy the violation of the right to freedom 
from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and are therefore an 
inadequate policy alternative to same-sex marriage. 
II THE LEGAL EVOLUTION THAT RESULTED IN CIVIL UNIONS 
Although New Zealand was rather slow off the mark to decriminalise 
homosexuality, the country has since been quite progressive in the provision of 
rights for same-sex couples. This section of the paper seeks to provide a brief 
overview of the history of the treatment of same-sex couples in New Zealand. 
A Historical Treatment of Same-Sex Couples 
It was not until 1986 that New Zealand decriminalised homosexuality, 
and even at this late stage there was an intense 15 month debate that divided the 
nation. However, from that point onwards legal recognition of same-sex 
relationships has advanced rapidly. Perhaps most significantly, sexual 
orientation was included in the Human Rights Act 1993 as a ground for 
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challenging discrimination. This provision prompted numerous amendments to 
legislation that failed to provide same-sex couples with equivalent protections as 
heterosexual couples in particular areas of law. An example of this is the 
Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (amended in 2001) which mandated a fifty-
fifty split of relationship property at the breakdown of same-sex de facto 
relationships as well as heterosexual de facto and marriage relationships. 
However, the piecemeal method of amending individual pieces of 
potentially discriminatory legislation was not particularly effective, and the 
movement for legal recognition of same-sex relationships on a more fundamental 
level began in the late 1990s. In 1998 the Court of Appeal decision of Quilter 
held that the MA could not be interpreted to allow for members of the same-sex 
to marry with, highlighting the current pertinence of the issue. 5 A majority of the 
Court also concluded that the restriction on marriage was not discrimination. 
Soon after the decision the Ministry of Justice published a backgrounding and 
discussion paper designed to outline the issues involved and to encourage public 
feedback. 6 The backgrounding paper highlighted a number of the key areas in 
which same-sex couples were excluded from the benefits accorded to 
heterosexual couples, while the discussion paper invited feedback on how same-
sex relationships should be treated in these areas. Additionally, it introduced the 
prospect of relationship registration as an alternative to same-sex marriage. 
5 
This decision will be discussed in greater depth in Part II: What is Discrimination? 
6 
Ministry of Justice Same-Sex Couples and the law- Backgrounding the Issues: Consultation 
Paper (Wellington, 1999); Ministry of Justice Same-sex couples and the law: Discussion Paper 
(Wellington, 1999). 
J 
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In 1999, under the belief that the Ministry ' s papers were not sufficiently 
thorough, the Law Commission followed up with a report of their own that 
canvassed the issue as they saw it, and weighed up the potential options. Basing 
its support for recognising same-sex relationships upon a personal autonomy 
argument, 7 it recommended the implementation of a registration scheme 
believing that it was far more "sensible" to devise a separate code for same-sex 
relationships . The reasoning they provided for this was that toleration of 
diversity is a two-way street, and " ... gays and lesbians should be prepared to 
acknowledge that they are not harmed by a legal code designed to avoid giving 
what may be seen as gratuitous offence to those for whom matrimony is a holy 
estate."8 It proposed that registered partnerships should be limited to same-sex 
couples, seeing no justification for allowing heterosexual couples this additional 
alternative to marriage. 9 
At the time of both the Ministry of Justice and the Law Commissions 
reports, same-sex marriage was not permitted anywhere in the World, whilst a 
number of European countries had adopted registration models. 10 This probably 
explains the New Zealand movement towards a form of registered partnerships 
as a less radical alternative to same-sex marriage. A private members civil union 
bill sponsored by Russell Fairbrother in 2001 was drafted but never balloted, so it 
was not until 2004 that a Government bill came before the House. It was 
7 New Zealand Law Commission Recognising Same-Sex Relationships (NZLC SP4, Wellington, 
1999) 2. 
8 New Zealand Law Commission Recognising Same-Sex Relationships (NZLC SP4, Wellington, 
1999) 
8. 
9 New Zealand Law Commission Recognising Same-Sex Relationships (NZLC SP4, Wellington, 
1999) 9. 
10 Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Greenland, the Netherlands, and Belgium all had 
registration models at the time. 
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introduced into the house on 21 June 2004 by the Hon David Benson-Pope along 
with its companion measure, the Relationships (Statutory References) Bill. 
The controversy surrounding the bill is evidenced by the amount of 
interest shown during the Select Committee process. The Select Committee 
received 6419 submissions and heard all 352 who requested oral hearings. Of 
the submissions, 2794 were opposed to the bill and 459 were in support. On 
their face these numbers suggest strong broad opposition to the bill. However, it 
appeared to the Select Committee that most of the submissions in opposition to 
the bill were deliberately orchestrated through religious groups. Therefore, it 
came to the conclusion that the people sending these submissions represented a 
small minority of people in New Zealand who hold a particular set of religious 
beliefs. 11 This is supported by the fact that at the time of the Select Committee 
process a recent Herald poll has indicated that 56% of New Zealander' s were in 
favour of the bill and 39% were opposed. 12 
After a few minor amendments recommended by the Select Committee, 
the Civil Union Bill proceeded through the legislative process and was passed on 
13 December 2004. The eventual passage of the CUA was considered by many 
to be a victory for the gay and lesbian community in that they had finally won the 
ability to gain the rights and responsibilities to which heterosexual couples have 
long been entitled, and were free from the shackles of long-lived 
11 
Justice and Electoral Select Committee "Civil Union Bill" (29 November 2004) 
<http://www.clerk.parliament.govt.nz> (last accessed 28 September 2005) 9-10. 
12 
Justice and Electoral Select Committee "Civil Union Bill" (29 November 2004) 
<http://www.clerk.parliament.govt.nz> (last accessed 28 September 2005) I 0. 
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discrimination. 13 Conversely, others viewed the CUA as a threat to the 
institution of marriage, and a sorry reflection of the slippery slope of moral 
decline in New Zealand society. 
B Relevant Policy Background to Civil Unions 
According to Labour's policy on rainbow issues, every person including gay, 
lesbian, transgender and bisexual New Zealanders, is entitled to fairness and 
equal rights under the law. The party claims to be committed to a human rights 
framework that upholds and protects the rights of all people, and promises to 
amend all remaining laws that cause unfair discrimination on the grounds of 
sexual orientation. 14 The creation of civil unions was an attempt to bring these 
aims into fruition. A stated policy objective behind providing a mechanism for 
same-sex couples to formally solemnise their relationship was to create a positive 
human rights culture, with an acknowledgment that a failure to provide such 
could be seen as not entirely consistent with human rights obligations. 15 
The CUA provides for legal registration of same-sex relationships, and by 
way of the companion measure, the RSRA (which is an omnibus piece of 
legislation amending more than 160 pieces of legislation), civil union couples are 
generally put on the same terms as married couples. The intended effect of the 
RSRA was to remove all unjustifiable discrimination on the basis of relationship 
14 Labour New Zealand <http: //www.labour.org.nz> (last accessed 14 July 2005). 
15 The Knowledge Basket <http: //www.knowledge-basket.co.nz> (last accessed 20 July); Cabinet 
Policy Committee "Government Civil Union Bill" ( 13 May 2003) POL (03) 117 
<http://www.justice.govt.nz> (last accessed 20 September 2005); Hon David Benson Pope 
(Associate Minister of Justice) (9 December 2004) 622 NZPD l 7639-17640. 
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status. 16 It was recognised that this discrimination was unduly harsh on same-sex 
relationships as they are unable to make the choice to marry. 
17 
Thus, the 
Government acknowledged that the exclusion of same-sex couples from the 
institution of marriage caused discrimination in that it completely denied them 
many of the concomitant rights and responsibilities. However, it seemed to 
consider that providing access to these benefits and obligations of marriage 
would be adequate protection from that discrimination. 
Indeed, it was thought by the Cabinet Policy Committee that a process for 
registering same-sex relationships would largely remove the Crown from 
exposure to legal action brought under human rights legislation. 18 It is assumed 
that by this it meant that the interpretation of the MA was no longer open to 
judicial challenge, as well as all the legislation dealing with the incidents of 
mamage. The Bill of Rights vet on the CUA did not reveal any concern 
regarding discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 19 Furthermore, an 
additional opinion was requested to consider the effect of clause 17 and 18 of the 
bill which allows for those who would otherwise be entitled to marry (i.e. 
heterosexual civil union partners) to have their civil union converted into a 
mamage. The Crown Law Office concluded that this section was not 
16 
Cabinet Policy Committee "Legal Recognition of Adult Relationships" (12 May 2006) POL 
(03) 116 <http://www.justice.govt.nz> (last accessed 20 September 2005). The RSRA was also 
intended to confer equal rights and obligations on de facto couples as well as civil union partners 
however this paper is only concerned with its effect on same-sex relationships. 
17 Cabinet Policy Committee "Legal Recognition of Adult Relationships" ( 12 May 2006) POL 
(03) 116 <http: //www.justice.govt.nz> (last accessed 20 September 2005). 
18 Cabinet Policy Committee "Government Civil Union Bill" ( 13 May 2003) POL (03) 117 
<http://www.justice.govt.nz> (last accessed 20 September 2005). 
19 Crown Law Office "Civil Union Bill: Legal Advice Consistency with the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990" (29 April 2004) <http://www.justice.govt.nz> (last accessed 17 June 2005). 
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discriminatory because any differential treatment arises under the MA not the 
CUA.20 
Another important part of the policy was to protect the traditional concept 
of marriage as understood at common law; the CUA was not intended to be an 
attack on marriage. 21 Although many of the submitters on the bill conflated the 
two institutions, civil unions are not marriage. Indeed, a stand alone Act was 
intended to reinforce the intention that marriage is limited to a union between 
one man and one woman. The CUA does not alter the MA at all, and following 
the Select Committee recommendations on the RSRA, specific amendments were 
made to the legislation to ensure that marriage is referred to differently to civil 
unions and de facto relationships. 22 
C Conclusion 
The Government recognised that both the absence of a mechanism 
through which same-sex couples could register their relationship and of access to 
the rights and obligations that flowed from that could be viewed as inconsistent 
with its obligation to prevent discrimination. The CUA and the RSRA were 
intended to remedy this situation. Indeed, it is now considered by many that the 
20 Justice and Electoral Select Committee "Civil Union Bill" (29 November 2004) 5 
<http ://www.clerk.parliament.govt.nz> (last accessed 28 September 2005). 
21 See Cabinet Policy Committee "Government Civil Union Bill" ( 13 May 2003) POL (03) 117 
<http://www.justice.govt.nz> (last accessed 20 September 2005); Justice and Electoral Select 
Committee "Civil Union Bill" (29 November 2004) 2 <http: //www.clerk.parliament.govt.nz> 
(last accessed 28 September 2005); <http: //www.clerk.parliament.govt.nz> (last accessed 29 July 
2005); Civil Union Campaign <http://www.civilunions.org.nz> (last accessed 2 August 2005); 
See also Hon David Benson Pope (Associate Minister of Justice) (9 December 2004) 622 NZPD 
17639. 
22 Justice and Electoral Select Committee " Relationships (Statutory References) Bill" ( I March 
2005) 3-4 <http: //www.clerk.parliament.govt.nz> (last accessed 28 September 2005). 
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Government has succeeded in removing discrimination on the ground of sexual 
orientation from New Zealand legislation. This is the belief held by Tim Barnett, 
the chairperson of the Select Committee, who claims that civil unions deliver on 
the decade old commitment in the Human Rights Act 1993 that the law will not 
discriminate on the ground of sexual orientation, marital status, or family 
status.23 
III WHAT IS DISCRIMINATION? 
This part of the paper will canvass both New Zealand's domestic and 
international obligations in relation to the right to freedom from discrimination, 
and the corresponding right to equality. It will then go on to consider how one 
determines whether or not the discrimination exists under the law. It will be 
argued that because New Zealand's discrimination jurisprudence is still in its 
infancy and is lacking in consensus, guidance should be drawn from the overseas 
developments, particularly Canada. Due to the numerous similarities between 
the two jurisdictions, it is finally submitted that a New Zealand Court would find 
it difficult to ignore the Canadian test. 
A New Zealand's Domestic Obligations 
Section 19 of the NZBORA provides that "[e]veryone has the right to 
freedom from discrimination on the grounds of discrimination in the Human 
Rights Act 1993." The NZBORA is rather unique as it does not specifically 
23 
Tim Barnett "Civil Union Bill Hits the Ground Running" (29 November 2004) Press Release 
<http://www.labour.org.nz> (last accessed 14 July 1005). 
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mention equality, let alone protect a right to it. The exclusion of a right to 
equality was a deliberate omission from the document in favour of the more 
simple protection from discrimination. 24 The concern expressed in the White 
Paper is that the meaning of ' equality before the law' is not only elusive and 
difficult to accurately define, but is also a dangerous concept as it enables courts 
to get involved in areas of substantive policy.25 
The right to freedom from discrimination differs from the right to 
equality in the sense that it does not leave the law books open to challenge in any 
respect that they perpetuate an inequality inequalities. This is to say, legislation 
can only be challenged in the context of the prohibited grounds of 
discrimination.26 As stated in section 19, the prohibited grounds are set out in 
section 21 of HRA 1993. Sexual orientation is one of these enumerated grounds 
on which discrimination is prohibited. 
However, despite the intention of the drafters, discrimination cannot be 
understood without some reference to equality because to prohibit discrimination 
is to prohibit distinctions that perpetuate inequality in respect of those prohibited 
grounds. 27 After all , the right to freedom from discrimination derives from the 
fundamental idea that everyone is equal before the law. 28 Therefore in the 
context of sexual orientation, the right to freedom from discrimination under the 
NZBORA essentially provides an equality guarantee and imposes upon the state 
24 A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper (1985) AJHR A6 para 10.81-10.82. 
25 A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper ( 1985) AJHR A6 para I 0.81-10 .82 . 
26 Grant Huscroft "Freedom from Discrimination" in Paul Rishworth and others The New 
Zealand Bill of Rights (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 2003) 325, 368 . 
27 Grant Huscroft " Freedom from Discrimination" in Paul Rishworth and others The New 
Zealand Bill of Rights (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 2003) 325, 380-381. 
28 See Quilter v Attorney-General [ 1998] I NZLR 523, 531 (CA) Thomas J. 
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an obligation to uphold that equality unless any unequal treatment can be 
justified. 29 Consequently, consideration of anti-discrimination law in New 
Zealand can profit considerably from reference to the advanced equality law 
emanating from overseas jurisdictions. 
B New Zealand's International Obligations 
New Zealand is also a party to and has ratified the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR)3°, the document that the NZBORA 
was enacted to give effect to. Article 26 of the ICCPR provides that: 
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to 
the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any 
discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against 
discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
Although Article 26 does not specifically enumerate sexual orientation as a 
ground of discrimination, the Human Rights Committee has expressed the view 
that the ground of 'sex' includes sexual orientation. 31 Although none of the 
principles of international documents are binding on New Zealand, they " ... paint 
a backdrop against which New Zealand's obligations and compliance can be 
placed."32 Thus the right to equality and freedom from discrimination are basic 
29 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 5. 
30 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (23 March 1976) <http://wwwunhrc.org> 
(last accessed 20 June 2004). 
3 1 Toonen v Australia (1995) 69 ALJ 602. 
32 Northern Regional Health Authority v Human Rights Commission ( 1997) HRNZ 37, 58. 
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human rights values of international law that New Zealand must observe in the 
creation of law and policy. 
C Quilter v Attorney-General 
In Quilter, the New Zealand Court of Appeal was required to consider whether 
the MA allowed for marriages between people of the same sex. It was argued by 
the claimants that section 19 of the NZBORA gave a clear indication that 
discrimination was not to be sanctioned by the courts, and thus required the 
Court to put a modem interpretation on the MA and the concept of marriage in 
light of section 6.33 However it was contended that no question of discrimination 
arose pursuant to section 19. Thus the question of whether the refusal to issue 
marriage licences to same-sex couples constituted discrimination was placed in 
issue. 
A full bench of the Court unanimously held that in any case the wording 
and scheme of the MA rendered it incapable of more than one meaning 
regardless of whether or not there was discrimination. 34 Therefore, the 
discussion and comments made in relation to discrimination may be seen as 
merely obiter dictum. Nonetheless, as all five judges felt compelled to consider 
the discrimination point, the case remains New Zealand' s most comprehensive 
consideration of the concept. 
33 Section 6 of the NZBORA provides that " [w]herever an enactment can be given a meaning that 
is consistent with the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights, that meaning shall be 
preferred to any other meaning." 
34 The reasons the Court gave for this decision will be further discussed below in Part V: 
Discrimination Against Same-Sex Couples and the Same-Sex Marriage Debate. 
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There was very little consistency between the judges in the approach 
taken to determining what constitutes discrimination, and the role played by 
section 5 of the BORA. The various judgments in the case are a perfect 
illustration of the complexity, uncertainty and difference of opinion in relation to 
the actual meaning of discrimination. Although at times seemingly confused, 
Tipping J concluded that discrimination constitutes any distinction that imposes a 
disadvantage; any justification should only be considered in relation to section 
5. 35 Thomas J takes a more restrictive approach, advocating the view that 
discrimination will only be invidious distinctions. Once this is established, 
section 5 has no role at all. 36 Both these minority judgments are to an extent 
consistent with Canadian law of the time, however there was a divergence in 
opinion in relation to where prospective justifications were relevant. 
With the exception of Gault J, the majority judgments gave little credence 
to the Canadian developments of the time. Keith J makes no attempt to provide a 
definition of discrimination, preferring to base his argument around the 
proposition that section 19 'does not reach' the matter of same-sex marriage.37 
The reasons that he presents for this are that overseas jurisprudence does not 
support the view that a prohibition on same-sex marriage is discriminatory; 38 it 
would not have been parliament's intent to use the broad language of the BORA 
to effect such a dramatic change on such a basic social, religious, public and 
legal institution;39 and the huge number of incidents of marriage emphasises the 
point that it is unlikely the BORA was intended to alter the basic elements of 
35 Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] I NZLR 523,576 (CA) Tipping J. 
36 Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] l NZLR 523,540 (CA) Thomas J. 
37 Quilter v Attorney-General [ 1998] I NZLR 523, 527 (CA) Gault J. 
38 Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] l NZLR 523,567 (CA) Keith J. 
39 Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] l NZLR 523, 567 (CA) Keith J. 
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marriage in such an indirect way.40 Parliament's approach in the past, he argues, 
is to address the legal recognition of homosexuality in a particularistic way. 41 In 
his opinion, discrimination is an area that should be approached in a pragmatic 
and functional way because it is a complex principle that cannot always be 
applied automatically and comprehensively.42 
Gault J proffered a purposive approach to the right, limiting the 
protection to impermissible differentiation under the law, a similar approach to 
Thomas J. However, under his analysis there would still be the opportunity for 
justifying the distinction under section 5.43 Furthermore, in his application he 
employs a similarly situated test in concluding that no distinction is being drawn 
on the basis of sexual orientation as two same-sex heterosexuals wanting to 
marry would be treated in exactly the same way.44 Additionally, he concurred 
with the opinion of Keith J. Richardson P did not try and define the right, but 
agreed with both Keith J and Gault J that the right does not require the legislative 
recognition of same-sex marriages. 
The lack of consensus amongst the judges renders Quilter largely 
unhelpful in determining exactly what the concept of discrimination entails, and 
demonstrates that jurisprudence is still very much in its infancy in New Zealand. 
All that is possible to discern for certain is that discrimination requires a 
40 Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] I NZLR 523 , 571 (CA) Keith J. 
41 Quilter v Attorney-General [I 998] I NZLR 523, 564-565 (CA) Keith J. 
42 Quilter v Attorney-General [ I 998] I NZLR 523, 567 (CA) Keith J. 
43 Quilter v Attorney-General [ I 998] I NZLR 523, 527 (CA) Gault J. 
44 Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] I NZLR 523, 527 (CA) Gault J. As will be illustrated 
below, the similarly situated test has been rejected as an adequate manner in which to determine 
discrimination. 
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distinction based on a personal characteristic. Consequently, it becomes 
necessary to look beyond New Zealand law in order to glean useful guidance. 
D Formal versus Substantive Equality 
1 Dijferent;a/ treatment based on personal character;s1;cs 
The history of the concept of equality reveals two pnmary models ; formal 
equality and substantive equality. The idea formal equality model can be traced 
back to Aristotle who said that "justice considers that persons who are equal 
should have assigned to them equal things" and "there is no inequality when 
unequals are treated in proportion to the inequality existing between them. "45 
Under this model, law is regarded as satisfying equality guarantees when there is 
identical treatment of ' alike ' persons. As equality jurisprudence has developed 
there has been a shift in judicial thinking that formal equality is not the 
satisfactory determinant to the question of discrimination. Consequently, the 
doctrine of substantive equality has emerged as the preferable model. 
The formal equality model is concerned with equal treatment under the 
law. This means that as long as alike individuals are treated identically, there is 
no distinction being drawn and thus no discrimination. Although it does allow 
for proportionate differential treatment between persons who are not alike, it 
provides no criteria to determine whether one person is ' like ' another or who 
45 
See Peter W Hogg Constitutional Law of Canada (Thomson Canada Limited, Scarborough, 
2004) I 087-1088 ; Anne F Bayefsky and Mary Eberts Equality Rights and the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms (Carswell , Vancouver, 1985) 2. 
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should be compared to whom. 46 Formal equality is not concerned with the 
fairness of the outcome, but merely with the equality of the process itself. The 
similarly situated test is a restatement of formal equality, deeming a denial of 
equality to be made out if it could be shown that the law accorded the 
complainant worse treatment than others who were similarly situated. 47 The 
focus remains on process and not outcome. 
The primary problem with formal equality that different groups in society 
have different characteristics, and as a result may still suffer an infringement of 
their equality rights if they are treated equally in a formal sense under the law. 
True equality does not necessarily result from identical treatment. This was the 
reasoning adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Andrews v Law Society of 
Canada (Andrews/8 when it rejected formal equality as the appropriate test for 
the determination of true equality under section 15 of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms (Canadian Charter). This section provides that " ... [ e ]very 
individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to equal protection 
and equal benefit of the law without discrimination ... " . According to McIntyre J, 
sometimes formal distinctions will be necessary in order to accommodate the 
differences between individuals and produce equal treatment in a substantive 
sense. 
49 
The overriding consideration must be the impact of the law on the 
individual or group concerned:50 
46 
Peter W Hogg Constitutional Law of Canada (Thomson Canada Limited, Scarborough, 
2004)1088. 
47 
Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia [1989] I SCR 143 , 166 (SCC) McIntyre J. 
48 
Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia [1989] 1 SCR 143 (SCC). 
49 
Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia [ 1989] I SCR 143, 165-169 (SCC) McIntyre J. 
50 
Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia [1989) I SCR 143, 165 (SCC) McIntyre J. 
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Recognizing that there will always be an infinite variety of personal characteristics, 
capacities, entitlements and merits among those subject to a law, there must be 
accorded, as nearly as may be possible, an equality of benefit and protection and no 
more of the restrictions, penalties or burdens imposed upon one than another. 
Therefore, bad law will not be saved merely because it treats all individuals 
identically, and a law that makes distinctions will not necessarily be a bad law 
simply because it makes that distinction. 51 His Honour then went on to say that 
in the consideration of whether there is true equality or not one must consider the 
content of the law, its purpose, and its impact upon those to whom it applies as 
well as upon those to whom it does not apply.52 Essentially, an equality violation 
can be brought about either by a formal legal distinction on the basis of a 
personal characteristic or identical treatment that represents a failure to take into 
account underlying distinctions between groups within society. 53 The 
substantive equality model advocated in Andrews has since been affirmed and 
employed by the Supreme Court of Canada.54 
2 Does the differential treatment need to be invidious? 
This leads to the question of whether the differential treatment on the basis of a 
personal characteristic must be invidious in order to constitute discrimination. 
Discrimination is a relative concept and cannot be understood without 
comparative reference. Beyond that there is little certainty as to its meaning. 
51 Andrews v law Society of British Columbia [1989] I SCR 143, 167 (SCC) McIntyre J. 
52 Andrews v law Society of British Columbia [1989] I SCR 143, 168 (SCC) McIntyre J. 
53 Andrews v law Society of British Columbia [1989] I SCR 143, 167 (SCC) McIntyre J. 
54 
See for example Miron v Trundel [ 1995] 2 SCR 418 (SCC); Egan v Canada [ 1995] 2 SCR 513 
(SCC); and was more recently consolidated in law v Canada (Minster of Employment and 
Immigration) [1999] 1 SCR497 (SCC). 
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Legislation inevitably draws distinctions between groups in society and often 
those distinctions may be trifling, and equally often there exist differences in 
treatment that are much more contentious, causing a divergence of opinion as to 
whether or not they are discriminatory. 
The White Paper provides no aid in definition, as it assumes that the 
meaning of discrimination is not important:55 
The word 'discrimination' in this Article [section 19] can be understood in two 
senses- an entirely neutral sense, synonymous with ' distinction', or in an invidious 
sense with the implication of something unjustified, unreasonable, or irrelevant. 
However, the result would seem to be much the same on either interpretation, 
because of the application of Article 3 [now section 5] which authorises reasonable 
limitations prescribed by law on the rights guaranteed by the Bill. 
However, the distinction between rights and justification for the limitations upon 
rights is at the centre of the operation of the Bill of Rights. Before you can 
conclude whether a right has been infringed it is necessary to know what that 
right requires. It is not until we know whether that right has been infringed that 
the question of justification comes into play. 56 The problem with the 'neutral 
sense' approach is that it presumes that any difference in treatment based on a 
prohibited ground infringes the right. This would mean that legislation would 
frequently be in violation because, as stated above, legislation often draws 
55 A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper ( 1985) AJHR A6 para I 0.78. 
56 Grant Huscroft " Freedom from Discrimination" in Paul Rishworth and others The New 
Zealand Bill of Rights (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 2003) 325, 375. 
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distinctions between groups. Therefore, this approach is unrealistic as it would 
mean that trivial distinctions constitute discrimination. 
The Ministry of Justice advocates an approach that narrows the realm of 
prima facie discrimination, in taking the position that section 19 is infringed 
when there is differential treatment that confers a disadvantage. 
57 Although this 
approach is more attractive than the ' neutral sense ' approach because it limits the 
scope of the prima facie right to an extent, in reality the limit is of little 
significance because where there has been a distinction drawn on the basis of one 
of the prohibited grounds it is likely that it will cause some sort of disadvantage 
in every case.58 As a result, the interpretation and application of section 5 is left 
to determine the meaning of the right. 
The essence of discrimination, and its common understanding, suggests 
wrongful distinctions under the law, and the idea of requiring freedom from 
discrimination only makes sense if discrimination is negative in some way. 59 The 
problem with both the above interpretations is that, if either of them were to be 
adopted, prima facie discrimination would not necessarily be only those 
distinctions that were negative and may end up trivialising the protection. A 
more appropriate way of defining discrimination is to limit it to distinctions that 
involve invidious treatment. 
57 
Ministry of Justice The Non-Discrimination Standards of the Government and the Public 
Sector: Guidelines on How to Apply these Standards and Who is Covered (Wellington, 2002) 18-
19 <http://www.justice.govt.nz> (last accessed 25 September 2005). 
58 Grant Huscroft " Freedom from Discrimination" in Paul Rishworth and others The New 
Zealand Bill of Rights (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 2003) 325 , 376 . 
59 Grant Huscroft " Freedom from Discrimination" in Paul Rishworth and others The New 
Zealand Bill of Rights (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 2003) 325 , 376. 
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Moreover, this approach is consistent with the substantive equality model 
that has emerged out of Canada. Substantive equality is concerned with the 
result of the law and the impact that it has on the people to whom it applies as 
well as the people to whom it does not apply. It has evolved to a point where it 
assesses the impact of differential treatment ( whether that be a formal distinction 
or a failure to take into account a personal characteristic), with reference to the 
preservation of human dignity rather than the mere existence of a disadvantage. 
This approach was preferred in light of the purpose behind equality provisions. 
In the seminal case of Law v Canada (Law), Iacobucci J pronounced that the 
equality analysis under the Canadian Charter must be purposive and contextual.60 
In his opinion, the purpose of the section 15 protection is as follows: 61 
To prevent the violation of essential human dignity and freedom though the 
imposition of disadvantage, stereotyping, or political or social prejudice, and to 
promote a society in which all persons enjoy equal recognition at law as human 
beings or as members of Canadian society, equally capable and equally deserving 
of concern, respect and consideration. 
Consideration of this stated purpose immediately reveals the idea that the 
concept of discrimination or inequality is entangled with the notion that the 
differential treatment must be of such a nature that it is an affront to human 
dignity. As later stated by Iacobucci J, the protection and promotion of human 
dignity is the overriding concern of equality, and it infuses all elements of the 
60 Law v Canada (Minster of Employment and Immigration) [ 1999) I SCR 497, para 6 (SCC) 
Iacobucci J for the Court. 
61 Law v Canada (Minster of Employment and Immigration) [ I 999) I SCR 497, para 51 (SCC) 
Iacobucci J for the Court. 
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discrimination analysis. 62 Therefore, the definition of "substantive equality" is 
discrimination that brings into play the claimant's human dignity; the 
requirement of invidious discrimination is merely a restatement of the 
requirement that there must be substantive as opposed to formal inequality. 63 
Thus, the differential treatment must impose and obligation or withhold a benefit 
in a manner that denigrates the complainant group. 
3 The Law test 
Consolidating all the earlier Supreme Court discrimination cases, 64 his 
Honour then proposed a broad set of guidelines that can be used to help 
determine whether there is discrimination is any particular instance. It involves 
three broad inquiries. The first is whether there has been differential treatment 
involving either a formal distinction on the basis of a personal characteristic, or a 
failure to take into account an existing disadvantage resulting in substantially 
different treatment on the basis of one of more personal characteristics. 
Secondly, the differential treatment must be based on an enumerated or 
analogous ground. Finally, the discrimination must be in a substantive sense 
bringing into play the purpose of section 15 in remedying such ills as prejudice, 
stereotyping and historical disadvantage. 65 
62 
law v Canada (Minster of Employment and Immigration) [1999] I SCR 497, para 51 (SCC) 
Iacobucci J for the Court. 
63 law v Canada (Minster of Employment and Immigration) [ 1999] I SCR 497, para 84 (SCC) 
facobucci J for the Court. 
64 
The cases that had the most significant effect on the creation of this test were Andrews v law 
Society of British Columbia [ 1989] I SCR 143 (SCC); Egan v Canada [ 1995] 2 SCR 513 (SCC); 
Miron v Trundel [ 1995] 2 SCR 418 (SCC). 
65 law v Canada (Minster of Employment and fmmigration) (1999] I SCR 497, para 39 (SCC) 
Iacobucci J for the Court. 
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Iacobucci J proffered four contextual factors that should be used at the 
touchstone of the final inquiry- pre-existing disadvantage, stereotype or 
vulnerability of the claimant; correspondence between the grounds and the 
claimants actual needs, capacities and circumstances; ameliorative purpose or 
effects on more disadvantaged individuals; and the nature of the interest 
affected. 66 
E Justifications for Discrimination 
In both New Zealand and Canada there is provision in our respective human 
rights instruments that allow for limitations to be put on rights provided they are 
demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society. The provisions are 
section 5 of the NZBORA and section 1 of the Canadian Charter. Despite the 
fact that the Canadian test for discrimination requires the differential treatment to 
discriminate in a substantive sense, the Supreme Court still deems the section 1 
analysis to be imperative.67 The legal test applied in a New Zealand section 5 
analysis derives from the test formulated in the Canadian case R v Oakes,68 the 
requirements and application of which will be assessed in Part VII of this paper. 
F Conclusion 
New Zealand is yet to develop its own test for discrimination. On the 
other hand, Canada has developed a comprehensive test as a result of extensive 
66 law v Canada (Minster of Employment and Immigration) [1999] I SCR 497, para 62-75 (SCC) 
Iacobucci J for the Court. 
67 See Andrews v law Society of British Columbia [ I 989] I SCR 143, 167 (SCC). 
68 R v Oakes [1986] I SCR 103, 138-139 (SCC) Dickson CJ. 
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opportunity to consider what the concept means over the last decade. The Law 
test, created with the purpose of equality provisions in mind, encapsulates both 
the intent to assure equality in a substantive sense and only to only prohibit 
discrimination that is invidious. Given the fact that the NZBORA was based on 
the Canadian Charter; the subsequent similarities between the two documents in 
the sense that both have a justification provision; and the common law basis of 
the two jurisdictions, it would be difficult and nonsensical for a New Zealand 
Court to ignore and refuse to apply this sophisticated Canadian test. 
IV THE IMPORTANCE OF EQUALITY AND ANTI-DISCRIMINATION 
LAW 
This part of the paper will briefly outline why the preservation of equality is 
pertinent, both from a human rights and a social policy point of view. These 
perspectives will be considered both generally and in the context of the same-sex 
marriage relationships. 
A Protection of Fundamental Human Riglzts 
In general terms, equality is the constant thread underlying human rights 
discourse and is therefore a human rights guarantee that should be fervently 
defended in the creation of both policy and legislation. As propounded by 
Huscroft, equality is the backbone to a bill of rights. 
69 It ensures that all 
individuals retain a sense of self-worth and feel worthy of concern and respect 
allowing them to participate in and contribute fully to society. Applying this to 
69 A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper ( 1985) AJHR A6 para I 0.81-10.82. 
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the issue at hand, the provision of equality for same-sex couples is essential to 
redress the historical discrimination that they have long been subjected to. Only 
then will the dignity of same-sex couples be respected. 
In its 1999 report, the Law Commission asserted that the same-sex 
marriage debate was not advanced by rights talk because our human rights 
legislation is not supreme. 70 It is submitted that this contention undermines 
human rights completely and the state's obligation to uphold them, effectively 
rendering the NZBORA redundant. Despite the fact that the NZBORA does not 
have the status of supreme law, this does not detract from the human rights 
standard that it sets and to which the state should comply. Given the 
fundamental nature of the right to be free from discrimination, human rights 
legislation provides a compelling foundation upon which a claim for same-sex 
marriage can be brought. Although the decision of Quilter may suggest 
otherwise, an assessment of the developments in both Canada and the United 
States indicates that it is the social position of same-sex couples has advanced 
significantly in more recent years and it is time for a fresh look at the 
discrimination question in the context of same-sex relationships.71 
70 
New Zealand Law Commission Recognising Same-Sex Relationships (NZLC SP4, Wellington, 
1999) 2. 
71 The developments in Canada and the United States will be discussed further in Part V. 
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B How Can Equality be seen as Promoting Social Policy Goals? 
1 Generally 
From a social policy perspective, the smooth running of society is undoubtedly 
dependant to an extent on the even-handedness of the law. Unless the law 
reflects that everyone is equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration 
then society will be perpetually plagued by feelings of unrest and injustice. 
When the ultimate goal is social cohesion and harmony, such a state of affairs is 
undesirable. Although societal attitudes and acceptance may take time to adjust 
to contemporary human rights goals, the perpetuation of prejudice in the law 
only hinders this process. 
2 The same-sex relationship context 
Formal registration strengthens committed relationships by providing a vehicle 
for couples to publicly declare their love and commitment. 72 Equal recognition 
would provide same-sex couples with a mechanism to express their commitment 
to each other, receive public recognition and support, and then voluntarily 
assume a number of legal rights and obligations.73 Providing this opportunity for 
same-sex couples reinforces the commitment they make to each other and, and 
has the concomitant advantage of enhancing the overall stability of society. 
72 Civil Union Campaign <http://www.civilunions.org.nz> (last accessed 2 Aug 2005). 
73 Law Commission of Canada Beyond Conjuga/ity: Recognising and Supporting Close Personal 
Adult Relationships (Ottawa, 2001) 117. 
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Marriage itself is seen by many as a core foundational unit of society that 
enhances the welfare of the community at large because it has proven itself to be 
a durable institution for the organisation of society. 74 If marriage is the 
foundation stone of society because it provides for social cohesion, it surely must 
follow that providing same-sex relationships with equal recognition rights would 
advance this important social policy objective by encouraging stable and 
committed same-sex relationships over transient ones. 
There are people that argue that equal recognition of same-sex couples 
devalues marriage and discourages the formation of stable relationships.75 Yet, 
marriage and commitment have already lost popularity in recent decades and 
marriage today often does not result in life-long commitment. 76 In this case, 
surely there is a strong argument that creating equal legal recognition of opposite 
and same-sex couples encourages a trend back towards stable relationships as the 
norm by promoting committed relationships for all couples. Therefore, it is 
submitted that if same-sex marriage were permitted it would serve to strengthen 
marriage as an institution, not devalue it. 
Equal recognition would provide the additional benefit of providing a 
supportive and stable environment for children simply because it encourages 
stability. Children are going to benefit from this stability whether or not they are 
74 See Halpern v Canada (AG) (2003) 225 DLR (4 th) 529, para 116 (Ont CA). 
75 See for example Alison Laurie Report on the Written Submissions to the Justice and Electoral 
Select Committee on the Civil Union Bill and Relationships (Statutory References) Bill 
(Wellington, November 2004) 6. 
76 Civil Union Campaign <http://www.civilunions.org.nz> (last accessed 2 Aug 2005). 
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biologically related to both the parents or not. 77 There is something more that is 
invested in a legally recognised relationship which means that it is less likely to 
end. 78 As with marital children, this measure of family support and stability 
comes both in an emotional and financial form. Furthermore, equal recognition 
of relationships would likely accord the family with greater social approval that 
would enhance the sense of self-worth within children. 
Furthermore, equal treatment of same-sex couples advances the social 
policy goal of recognising the diversity of society and choices people make 
regarding relationships in 21 st century New Zealand. Rather than denying their 
existence, legal recognition accepts and supports that diversity which in tum 
leads to a more stable society. This is a policy objective expressly stated in 
section 10 of the Family Commission Act 2003 under which the Commission 
must have regard to the diversity of families. Additionally, legally recognising 
relationship diversity is economically advantageous as registered couples become 
financially dependant on each other as opposed to the state. 
77 Mark Strasser "The Logical Case for Same-Sex Marriage: A Response to Professor John Witte 
Jr" in Lynne D Wardle and others (eds) Marriage and Same-Sex Unions: A Debate (Praeger 
Publishers, Westport, 2003) 60,61 . 
78 Civil Union Campaign <http://www.civilunions.org.nz> (last accessed 2 Aug 2005). 
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V DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
AND THE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE DEBATE 
A The Marriage Act 1955 
There is no definition of marriage in the New Zealand MA, and thus no explicit 
statement that marriage is restricted to a union between one man and one woman. 
In fact, the Act adopts largely gender-neutral language throughout. However, at 
the time that the MA was enacted, it was accepted in Quilter that common 
understanding was that marriage was the union of one man and one woman to the 
exclusion of all others.79 Furthermore, the MA does contain certain provisions 
which reflect the traditional understanding of the concept, most particularly 
section 15 and the Second Schedule. 
Section 15 states that subject to the provisions of the section, a marriage 
is void if it is prohibited by the provisions of the Second Schedule which states 
persons who are within the degrees of consanguinity. The Second Schedule is 
divided into two parts. The first part of the Schedule lists the people that a man 
may not marry, and the list only contains people of the female gender. The 
second part lists the people that a woman may not marry, containing only people 
of the male gender. Certainly it would amount to a large anomaly within the Act 
if a man was not able to marry his sister but was able to marry his brother. Thus, 
the Second Schedule strongly supports the view that marriage is restricted to 
unions between a man and a woman to the exclusion of all others. As these 
79 See Quilter v Attorney-General [ 1998] I NZLR 523 , 577 (CA) Tipping J. 
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prov1s1ons reinforced the traditional understanding on marnage, the Court m 
Quilter felt compelled to interpret the Act as such. 
B The New Zealand Approach to Same-Sex Marriage 
In light of this interpretation, the essential thrust of the majority opinion 
regarding discrimination towards same-sex couples was that because marriage is 
by definition heterosexual it is therefore not discrimination to prohibit same-sex 
marriage; to allow it would be a contradiction in terms. However, this approach 
leaves the essential question begging- is the traditional definition discriminatory? 
In their opinion recognition of same-sex relationships was an area of social 
policy best left to Parliament, no doubt feeling tightly restrained by section 4 of 
the NZBORA which protects parliamentary sovereignty,80 and reluctant to make 
such a bold move given the failure of other countries to deem the restriction on 
marriage discriminatory. 
However, the following sections will reveal that smce this decision, 
overseas Courts have been progressively diverging from the approach of the 
Quilter majority which employs the traditional concept of marriage to justify the 
prohibition on same-sex marriage. It is therefore tenuous to continue to rely on 
this decision as authority for the assertion that the prohibition on same-sex 
marriage does not constitute discrimination. 
80 
Section 4 of the NZBORA provides that " [n]o Court shall , in relation to any other 
enactment. .. (a) Hold any other provision of the enactment to be impliedly repealed or revoked , 
or to be in any way invalid or ineffective; or (b) Decline to apply any provision of the enactment-
by reason only that the provision is inconsistent with any provision of this Bill of Rights." 
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C Developments in Canada 
I Early decisions 
As in New Zealand, the legal definition of marriage in Canada was for a long 
time based on the 1866 English case of Hyde v Hyde in which Lord Penzance 
defines it as- "[m]arriage ... may be defined as ... the voluntary union ... of one man 
and one woman to the exclusion of all others." 81 Despite and increasing 
acceptance of homosexuality and limited recognition of same-sex relationships in 
the law for family purposes,82 Canadian courts still refused to accord same-sex 
couples the same status as heterosexual couples because this was simply a 
definitional matter and therefore not discriminatory. 83 The rationale behind the 
restriction on marriage related to what was considered to be the primary purpose 
of marriage- procreation. Same-sex couples lacked the biological ability to fulfil 
this purpose and it is merely this reality that is reflected in the restriction on 
· 84 mamage. 
2 The movement begins 
Affirmative development for same-sex couples began in Egan v Canada 
when the Canadian Supreme Court held that sexual orientation would be 
81 HydevHydeandWoodmanse(1866) LR I PD 130, 133 . 
82 Nicholas Bala " Redefining Marriage in Canada and the United States: Moving in the Same 
Direction, But at Different Speeds" (12 th World Conference of the International Society of 
Family Law, Salt Lake City, 19-23 July 2005) 5. 
83 Layland v Ontario (Minister of Consumer and Commercial relations) ( 1993) 14 OR (3d) 658 
(Div Ct). 
84 See for example Layland v Ontario (Minister of Consumer and Commercial relations) (1993) 
14 OR (3d) 658,666 (Div Ct). 
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analogous ground under section 15 of the Canadian Charter. 
85 The Court, 
however, once agam denied the claim on the basis that the raison d 'etre of 
marriage is anchored in the biological and social realities that only heterosexual 
couples can procreate.86 Nonetheless, positive ground was soon made in the case 
of M v Hin which the Canadian Supreme Court had to decide whether it was 
discrimination to restrict the obligation to pay spousal support to heterosexual 
couples. 87 Using the Law test, the Court found that this amounted to 
discrimination. The Court also acknowledged that same-sex relationships can 
share many conjugal characteristics and that no relationship need fit into the 
traditional marital model to demonstrate that it is conjugal. 88 This decision 
prompted some provinces to enact legislation that gave same sex couples the 
same rights based on a period of conjugal cohabitation,89 while others actually 
provided registered partnership laws. 90 
3 Same-Sex marriage 
This movement eventually led to challenges being made to the traditional 
definition of marriage that had been relied on to define capacity to marry, and 
soon decisions in the Court of Appeal in both Ontario and British Columbia held 
85 Egan v Canada [1995] 2 SCR 513 (SCC). 
86 Egan v Canada [I 995] 2 SCR 513, paras 21 and 25 (SCC) La Forest J. 
87 Mv H [1999] 2 SCR 3 (SCC). 
88 Mv H [1999] 2 SCR 3, para 58-59 (SCC) Cory J. Characteristics ofa conjugal relationship (of 
or relating to marriage or the relationship of spouses are shared shelter, sexual and personal 
behaviour, services, social activities, economic support and children as well as the societal 
perception of a couple. These may be present in varying degrees and need not be present at all; 
Molodowich v Pettinen (1980) 17 RFL (2d) 376 (Ont Dist Ct). 
89 Nicholas Bala "Redefining Marriage in Canada and the United States: Moving in the Same 
Direction, But at Different Speeds" (1 th World Conference of the International Society of 
Family Law, Salt Lake City, 19-23 July 2005) 7. 
90 These states that enacted registered partnerships laws were Nova Scotia, Manitoba and Quebec. 
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that the prohibition on same-sex mamage was discriminatory. 91 The starting 
point of both these cases was to decide whether there was a common law bar on 
same-sex marriage. After concluding that there was, the Courts then went on to 
consider whether or not that common law bar constituted discrimination by 
applying the Law test. This approach represented a marked divergence from 
previous cases that refused to proceed with a discrimination analysis after 
deciding that the common law definition limited marriage to heterosexuals. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Halpern v Canada is the most 
commonly cited judgment relating to the Canadian constitutional right to 
marry. 92 When considering the four contextual factors of the Law test, the Court 
placed emphasis on the historical disadvantage and prejudice suffered by 
homosexuals,93 and the importance of the interest affected. The Court concluded 
that same-sex couples were excluded from an important fundamental societal 
institution that had significant corresponding benefits. Because the exclusion 
was not based on the need of the claimants and had no ameliorative purpose, it 
was held to perpetuate the view that same-sex relationships are less worthy of 
recognition and thereby demeans their dignity.94 Under the section 1 analysis the 
Court refused to accept that the objectives of uniting the opposite sexes; 
encouraging the birth and raising of children of the marriage; and companionship 
were valid justifications for the restriction on marriage. As a result, the Court 
91 Halpern v Canada (AG) (2003) 225 DLR (4th) 529 (Ont CA); £GALE Canada Inc v Canada 
(AG) (2003) 13 BCLR (4th) I (CA). 
92 Nicholas Bala " Redefining Marriage in Canada and the United States: Moving in the Same 
Direction, But at Different Speeds" ( 12th World Conference of the International Society of 
Family Law, Salt Lake City, 19-23 July 2005) 9. 
93 Halpern v Canada (AG) (2003) 225 DLR (4th) 529, paras 82-87 (Ont CA). 
94 Halpern v Canada (A G) (2003) 225 DLR (4th) 529, para 107 (Ont CA) . 
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refo1mulated the common law definition of marriage as "the voluntary union for 
life of two persons to the exclusion of all others". 
95 
The federal cabinet decided not to appeal this decision and within a week 
a reference case was bought before the Supreme Court of Canada to determine 
the constitutionality of allowing for same-sex marriage. The Court concluded 
that the federal government could enact this legislation and no religious celebrant 
would be required to perform a same-sex marriage. The Civil Marriage Act 
received assent on 19 July 2005. Canada is now the fourth country in the World 
· · 96 to permit same-sex mamage. 
D Developments in tlze United States 
Same-sex couples in the United States have found it more difficult to attain legal 
recognition for their relationships. However the last decade has witnessed some 
significant developments. Challenges were first made to the traditional 
definition of marriage in the 1970's, but the first success did not come until 1996 
in a Hawaii trial Court decision which ruled that there was no compelling reason 
to justify the ban. 97 Before this decision could be appealed, the state voters 
passed a state constitutional amendment that allowed the state government to 
limit marriage to heterosexual couples. A similar course of events was played 
out in Alaska.98 Challenges to the traditional concept of marriage prompted a 
campaign that resulted in the passage of the Defence of Marriage Act 1996 at 
95 Halpern v Canada (AG) (2003) 225 DLR (4th) 529, para 154 (Ont CA). 
96 Canada joins Belgium (2003), the Netherlands (200 I), and Spain (June 29 2005) in permitti~g 
same-sex marriage. 
97 Baker v Miike ( 1996) WL 694235 (Haw Cir Ct). 
98 
See Brause v Bureau of Vital Statistics ( 1998) WL 88743 (Alaska Super Ct). 
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federal level. This statute provides that for the purposes of all federal law 
marriage is the union between a man and a woman. This immediately reduces 
the effect of any state recognition of same-sex marriage as those marriages will 
remain excluded from the federal benefits of marriage. Furthermore, it provides 
that no state is required to give legal effect to same-sex marriage. 
Although the courts of many states continue to uphold the traditional 
concept of marriage largely on the basis of the procreation argument, others have 
taken a more activist approach. For example, in 1999 the Vermont Supreme 
Court held that they restriction on same-sex marriage violated the common 
benefits clause of the State Constitution. 99 The Court instructed the state 
legislature to remedy the breach but allowed them to decide whether to provide 
for same-sex marriage or create an equivalent institution. The legislature opted 
to allow same-sex couples to enter into civil unions under which they would be 
entitled to all the state benefits to which married couples were entitled. 
More significantly, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled 
that civil unions were not adequate to remedy the constitutional infirmity it had 
found to exist under the traditional definition of marriage. 100 It held that civil 
unions would not provide full equality, but would instead foster a "stigma of 
exclusion that the Constitution prohibits". 101 The state of Massachusetts began 
99 Baker v State ( 1999) 744 A 2d 864 (Vt). 
100 See In re Opinion of the Justices: SJC-09 I 63 [2003] 440 Mass 120 I (Supreme Judicial Court 
of Massachusetts); Goodridge v Department of Public Health [2003] Mass 309 (Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts). 
10 1 See In re Opinion of the Justices: SJC-09 I 63 [2003] 440 Mass 120 I, 1208 (Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts). 
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issuing licences on May 17, 2004, however these marnages do not receive 
recognition under federal law. 
Similar legal challenges are working there way through the courts in 
other states, 102 and other states have enacted domestic partnership laws that allow 
same-sex couples to register their relationships. 103 These statutes have been 
instigated by political advocacy rather than litigation, and vary in the extent to 
which they confer rights to the participants. However, there remain 43 states that 
have passed legislation defining marriage between a man and a woman which 
make constitutional challenges to this traditional definition more difficult. 
104 
Nonetheless, there has also been a significant shift of attitude in the United States 
regarding the equality of prohibiting same-sex marriage. It is uncertain whether 
this will eventually lead same-sex marriage being a norm, but the events in 
Massachusetts indicate that this is possible. 
E Significance for New Zealand 
Quilter remains good law in New Zealand, and whether or not you consider the 
discrimination point to be obiter dictum or not, the majority opinion has 
generally been accepted as the current state of the law. Thus, to assert that civil 
unions do not remedy the discrimination under the MA would seem an illogical 
argument if there were no rights infringement in the first place. However this 
section has illustrated that since Quilter, both Canadian and United States Courts 
102 California, Connecticut, Maryland, Florida, New Jersey, New York and Washington . 
103 California, New Jersey, Maine, Hawaii , Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, New York, Washington , 
Oregon, New Mexico, and Rhode Island. 
104 See Lambda Legal <http://www.lambdalegal.com> (last accessed 28 Sept 2005). 
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have been increasingly willing to move beyond shielding constitutional 
challenges using the traditional concept of marriage, and actually determine 
whether that definition is constitutional. More and more the traditional 
understanding is becoming the start rather than the end of the inquiry. In Canada 
and Massachusetts, legal challenges have already resulted in same-sex marriage. 
Therefore, it is submitted that if a Quilter situation were to come before 
the New Zealand court again these overseas decisions would warrant a fresh look 
at the discrimination question. In Quilter Keith J placed significant emphasis on 
the fact that no other countries had recognised same-sex marriage, 105 indicating 
a reluctance to make a ruling that was inconsistent with overseas trends. Now 
that the trend has shifted, the logical conclusion for the Court would be to follow 
that lead and find that the prohibition on marriage per se constitutes 
discrimination. This therefore leads us to the question of what effect civil unions 
have on that discrimination, complicating the issue significantly. 
In its advisory opinion, the Supreme Court of Canada was to consider 
whether the common law understanding of marriage (that prohibited same-sex 
marriage) was constitutional, but refused to address this question, not wanting to 
force the issue given that the federal government had stated its intention to 
provide for same-sex marriage regardless of the opinion. 106 On the other hand, 
the Massachusetts Supreme Court insisted that same-sex marriage was 
imperative and civil unions were inadequate. However, the constitutional set-up 
of the United States is very different to New Zealand. Therefore, neither of these 
105 Quilter v Attorney-General [I 998] I NZLR 523, 567 (CA) Keith J. 
106 Reference Re Same-Sex Marriage (2004) SCR 79, paras 61-71 (SCC). 
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two decisions would be of themselves entirely authoritative on the issue in New 
Zealand. Thus, this issue will be assessed in depth in the following part. 
Further underlying this issue is whether the Court would have the 
mandate to reconsider the actual outcome of Quilter and to redefine the common 
law definition of marriage in light of section 6 of the NZBORA, notwithstanding 
the enactment of the CU A and the RSRA. 107 On the one hand there is the 
argument that by turning their mind to the issue Parliament has eschewed same-
sex marriage, a point reinforced by the alterations to terminology in the RSRA to 
make the spouse-partner distinction clear. 108 This situation would prohibit the 
Court backtracking from Quilter. On the other hand there is the argument that 
since Quilter the legal recognition of all kinds of relationships has been 
constantly evolving and the CUA and RSRA was merely a part of that evolution. 
Given that the creation of civil unions in other overseas countries has not been 
the end of the evolution, it is submitted that this argument is more compelling, 
thus opening a window for the Court to reconsider the result of Quilter. 
109 
F Conclusion 
Although Quilter is still good law in New Zealand, overseas developments 
render it a tenuous authority for the assertion that the restriction on same-sex 
107 See footnote 33 for the text of section 6. 
108 Justice and Electoral Select Committee " Relationships (Statutory References) Bill" ( I March 
2005) 3-4 <www.clerk .parliament.govt.nz> (last accessed 28 September 2005). 
109 The Netherlands, for example, are illustrative of this continued evolutionary pattern. The 
country repealed sodomy laws in 1810, equalised the age of sexual consent between same and 
opposite-sex couples in 1971, enacted anti-discrimination legislation protecting gays and lesbians 
in 1983 , established same-sex registered partnerships in 1998, and legalised same-sex marriage in 
2001 . 
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marriage does not constitute discrimination. It is submitted that a New Zealand 
court would feel compelled to conclude that the prohibition on same-sex 
marriage was discrimination per se, and would thus be required to consider the 
significance that civil unions have on that discrimination. The purpose of the 
following section is to carry out this analysis and determine whether or not the 
creation of civil unions remedies this state of discrimination under the MA. 
VI THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CIVIL UNIONS ON THIS 
DISCRIMINATION 
This section of the paper proceeds on the basis that the prohibition on same-sex 
marriage per se constitutes discrimination and goes on to assess the significance 
of civil unions in alleviating that discrimination. The discrimination 
jurisprudence that has emerged out of Canada will be used in the analysis. It will 
be argued that the restriction of access to a fundamental institution puts same-sex 
couples at a disadvantage despite the availability of civil unions, and does so in a 
manner that denigrates same-sex couples. It is not denied that there are positive 
aspects to civil unions, but it is submitted that it is incorrect to claim they fulfil 
human rights imperatives. 
A Is there differential Treatment Based on Sexual Orientation? 
The enactment of the CU A does not change the fact that there is a formal 
distinction drawn under the MA on the basis of sexual orientation; the creation of 
civil unions in no way altered the current understanding of marriage under the 
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Act as interpreted by the Court in Quilter. Therefore, the focus here will be 
whether that distinction still amounts to substantive discrimination. 
B Does the Distinction Discriminate in a Substantive Sense in that it is 
Demeaning to the Dignity of Same-Sex Couples? 
As has been discussed in Part III, the existence of a distinction in the law is not 
enough to constitute discrimination. According to Law, a formal distinction 
drawn under the law will not necessarily be discriminatory unless the distinction 
discriminates in a substantive sense by imposing a disadvantage in a manner that 
perpetuates a prejudice or stereotype. Iacobucci J provides a helpful explanation 
of how on is to determine whether or not the distinction is demeaning to 
d
. · 11 0 1gmty: 
Human dignity means that an individual or group feels self-respect and self-worth. 
lt is concerned with physical and psychological integrity and empowerment. 
Human dignity is harmed by the unfair treatment premised upon personal traits or 
circumstances which do not relate to individual needs, capacities, or merits . lt is 
enhanced by laws which are sensitive to the needs, capacities, and merits of 
different individuals, taking into account the context underlying their differences. 
Human dignity is harmed when individuals and groups are marginalized, ignored or 
devalued, and is enhanced when laws recognize the full place of all individuals and 
groups within ... society. 
Therefore, the issue that remains to be determined is whether civil unions 
are adequate to recognise the full place of same-sex couples within society by 
110 Law v Canada (Minster of Employment and Immigration) [1999] I SCR 497, para 53 (SCC) 
facobucci J for the Court. 
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according them concern, respect and consideration notwithstanding the 
prohibition on marriage. Overarching this analysis will be the four contextual 
factors outlined in Law, 111 which must be assessed from the point of view of a 
reasonable person in the position of the affected group. 112 It is important to point 
out at this stage that intention is not crucial to a successful discrimination 
claim. 11 3 
1 Differences between marriage and civil unions 
The CUA is based on the prov1s10ns of the MA, but has been modernised to 
reflect the current law, policy and practice. 114 Thus, in form and process civil 
unions operate in largely the same way as marriages with only a few differences. 
They are essentially parallel institutions, 115 and it is generally considered that the 
differences between them are immaterial to the nature of the final product: 
• Minors will not have a legal civil union without their parents consent, 
whereas minors who marry without their parents consent will have a 
legal marriage; 11 6 
11 1 As out! ined on page these four factors are pre-existing disadvantage, stereotype or 
vulnerability of the claimant; correspondence between the grounds and the claimants actual needs, 
capacities and circumstances; ameliorative purpose or effects on more disadvantaged individuals; 
and the nature of the interest affected. 
11 2 law v Canada (Minster of Employment and Immigration) [1999] I SCR 497, para 59-61 
(SCC) Iacobucci J for the Court. 
113 See Andrews v law Society of British Columbia [ I 989] I SCR 143 , 174 (SCC); law v Canada 
(Minster of Employment and Immigration) [ 1999] I SCR 497, para 80 (SCC) Iacobucci J for the 
Court. 
114 Ministry of Justice Ministry of Justice <http://www.justice.govt.nz> (last accessed July 16). 
11 5 See Justice and Electoral Select Committee "Civil Union Bill" (29 November 2004) 
<http: //www.clerk.parliament.govt.nz> (last accessed 28 September 2005) 3. 
11 6 Compare Civil Union Act 2004, s 23(2)(b) with Ma1Tiage Act 1955, s 17. 
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• The terminology is different. Marriage partners are termed spouses, 
whereas after a civil union you are termed civil union partners; 
• Both civil unions and marriages require a celebrant. However there 
are separate application processes for becoming marriage and civil 
union celebrants and clergy are in a privileged position under the 
MA-11 1 
' 
• Whereas you can arrange for a New Zealand marriage overseas, you 
cannot arrange a New Zealand civil union overseas.
118 However, you 
can have your foreign marriage and civil union recognised as such in 
New Zealand, if your country is listed in the regulations in the case of 
. ·1 . 11 9 c1v1 uruons. 
In terms of the legal benefits that flow from the respective forms 
registration, it is necessary to consider the role of the RSRA. The CUA and the 
RSRA are interdependent and inextricably linked, as it is through the RSRA that 
civil union couples get the same rights as married couples. The RSRA amends 
over 160 pieces of legislation in order to provide civil union partners the same 
rights and obligations that are attendant to marriage. It was considered that am 
omnibus bill would be the most effective and efficient way to amend all this 
legislation. 
117 Civil Union Act 2004, s 26 and Marriage Act 1955, ss 7-14 . 
118 Marriage Act 1955, ss 41-43 . 
11 9 Civil Union Act 2004, s 25 . 
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2 Pre-existing disadvantage and stereotype 
The first contextual factor introduced in Law is whether or not there 
exists a pre-existing disadvantage, stereotype or vulnerability of the affected 
group. It cannot be denied that gays and lesbians are a group that has been 
historically subjected to considerable stigmatisation and prejudice. This fact was 
reinforced by the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage in the absence of 
an alternative form of registration. However, the CUA now provides for an 
equivalent institution, arguably remedying that historical disadvantage. It is 
understood that a group's interests are more adversely affected in situations 
involving complete non-recognition or exclusion of that group. 120 Therefore it 
must follow that affirmative action has been taken to protect and recognise what 
was an essentially ignored and marginalised group of society weakens a claim 
based on discrimination. 
3 The nature of the interest in question 
Although this argument may be initially compelling, in Law Iacobucci J 
cautioned that the mere fact that legislation takes into account the claimant's 
actual situation will not necessarily defeat a discrimination claim. This is 
because the focus of the inquiry must always remain upon the central question of 
the differential treatment imposed by the legislation has the effect of violating 
120 Egan v Canada [ I 995] 2 SCR 5 I 3, 556 (SCC) L'heureux-Dube J dissenting as cited in Law v 
Canada (Minster of Employment and Immigration) [ 1999] I SCR 497, para 74 (SCC) Iacobucci 
J for the Court. 
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human dignity. 121 The question that needs to be addressed is do civil unions go 
far enough? The guarantee of equality is not limited to the protection of 
economic rights, but an assessment of the discriminatory quality of a particular 
distinction in the law must also evaluate the societal significance of the interest 
affected. This will include consideration of whether the distinction restricts 
access to a fundamental institution of society or affects a basic aspect of full 
membership in society. 
122 Do civil unions recognise the full place of same-sex 
couples in society? 
(a) To what extent are civil unions a step down from marriage? 
Marriage and civil unions are conceptually the same and were intended to be 
identical in nature. Both institutions provide for formal registration of 
relationships after which they have a legal status that acts a vehicle for 
concomitant rights; both recognise expressions of love and commitment between 
individuals, granting them respect and legitimacy as a couple. Therefore, it 
could be argued that the CUA removes any special status that was once accorded 
to marriage. If there is no added value in marriage, the interest in issue (i.e. the 
ability to marry) becomes insignificant. Indeed, in the opinion of Tim Barnett, 
the CUA prevents the treatment of gay and lesbians as second-class citizens.
123 
Furthermore, given that there is no right to marriage in the NZBORA, there is no 
requirement that the state go any further and provide for same-sex marriage. 
121 law v Canada (Minster of Employment and Immigration) [1999] I SCR 497, para 70 (SCC) 
Iacobucci J for the Court. 
122 Egan v Canada [1995] 2 SCR 513 , 556 (SCC) L'heureux-Dube J dissenting as cited in law v 
Canada (Minster of Employment and Immigration) [1999] 1 SCR 497, para 74 (SCC) Iacobucci 
J for the Court. 
123 Tim Barnett (2 December 2004) 622 NZPD 17406-17408. 
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This argument is closely related to the argument posed by the Law 
Commission in its 1999 report. In relation to its proposal for the creation of a 
new system of relationships registration, the New Zealand Law Commission 
claimed that it would possible for even the most cynical to observe that, as stated 
in Street v Mountford " .. . [t]he manufacture of a four-pronged implement for 
manual digging results in a fork even if the manufacturer, unfamiliar with the 
English language, insists that he intended to make and has made a spade." 124 
The essence of this argument is that with the enactment of civil unions the debate 
is reduced down to one of semantics. Because marriage and civil unions are 
essentially the same in all but name, why therefore quibble over the word 
' marriage ' when the two institutions fulfil the same social and legal purpose. 
Are civil unions not just a rose by another name? 125 
As an alternative argument, proponents of civil unions argue that in any 
event the status of marriage as society ' s highest representation of self-worth is 
merely an historical perspective that will change over time; civil unions are an 
entirely new institution with vast potential for developing its own culture that 
could come to be as equally accepted as marriage. Whereas marriage is 
accompanied by an overhanging cloud of historical prejudice, civil unions will 
124 Street v Mountford (1985] AC 809, 819 as cited in New Zealand Law Commission 
Recognising Same-Sex Relationships (NZLC SP4, Wellington, l 999) 8. 
125 In re Opinion of the Justices: SJC-09/63 [2003] 440 Mass 1201 , 1220 (Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts) Justice Sosman dissenting. Justice Sosman claimed that the matter was a 
squabble over the name to be used and who gets to use the 'm' word . She also made reference to 
Shakespeare ' s famous phrase about a rose by any other name swelling as sweet. 
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develop their own unique characteristics and sense of purpose over time. 
126 In 
the opinion of Tim Barnett, the enactment of the CUA has provided something 
that is one step better than marriage- "By the end I felt we had gone one stage 
better- creating a 21 
st Century institution, open to all , with its own culture and 
tradition still to develop. What a Rainbow-moulded gift to the whole 
community." 127 This feeling is reinforced by the fact that civil urnons are 
intended to be an inclusive institution that treats both same-sex couples and 
heterosexuals as equals. They surpass religious, spiritual or conservative 
prejudice by according all relationships equal value and worth and this is an 
extremely positive development. 
Moreover, because marriage as an institution carries with it both religious 
and cultural connotations there is a proportion of the gay and lesbian community 
that would never have any desire to opt into the institution at all , and would 
strongly advocate for a new institution free from the baggage that goes with 
marriage. In fact some members of the gay community consider marriage itself 
to be demeaning because of these connotations as well as the fact that marriage 
has a history of being used as an expression of dominant prejudices of the society 
and the time.12
8 On a similar theme, there are some that would not want to be a 
party to a marriage because same-sex marriage is properly a form of protective 
126 Tim Barnett "Civil Union Bill Hits the Ground Running" (29 November 2004) Press Release 
<http ://www.labour.org.nz> (last accessed 14 July I 005). 
127 Tim Barnett "Sarne-Sex Marriage the Kiwi Way" (7 June 2005) Press Release 
<http://www.labour.org.nz> (last accessed 14 July 1005). 
128 Tim Barnett (2 December 2005) 622 NZPD 17406. 
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assimilation. It is gays and lesbians complying with the heterosexual (or their) 
system. 129 
(b) The symbolic value of marriage 
Despite these arguments, it remains the necessary corollary of creating a new 
institution that it will not immediately have the equivalent symbolic value that 
accompanies an institution that has alone held a particular status in society for 
centuries. It is impossible to deny that marriage is an institution that has a 
history of symbolising the ultimate manifestation of love, commitment and 
stability. Although in Western society the institution may have originated in the 
Church, marriage is an institution that exists in the majority of cultures around 
the world. In this sense it is a union that transcends notions of culture and 
spirituality. When stripped down to its bare bones marriage represents the 
ultimate commitment of two people for the rest of their lives. Consequently, it 
cannot be viewed " ... merely as a bundle of rights, divisible by measures into 
checklists of benefits and responsibilities. Marriage is a privileged status, with 
an impact greater than the sum of its parts." 130 Indeed it is described by many as 
the cornerstone of society; the glue that prevents it from crumbling. 131 
129 
New Zealand Law Commission Recognising Same-Sex Relationships (NZLC SP4, 
Wellington, 1999) 4. 
130 David Buckel "Government fixes a label of inferiority on Same-Sex Couples When It Imposes 
Civil Unions and Denies Access to Marriage" (2005)16 Stan L & Pol'y Rev 73, 79. 
131 This was a frequently expressed view in submissions made to the Select Committee in regard 
to the CUA and the RSRA. See Alison Laurie Report on the Written Submissions to the Justice 
and Electoral Select Committee on the Civil Union Bill and Relationships (Statutory References) 
Bill (Wellington, November 2004) 6. 
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Although it is true that with the benefit of time civil unions may be able 
to develop its only symbolic meaning, at present their symbolic value 1s 
incomparable with marriage. Indeed, to people who enter into them and to 
society there is a significant difference between marriage and civil unions from a 
symbolic and emotional perspective. 
132 The significance of the institution of 
marriage can be evidenced by the fact that the right to marry is a right that is 
protected by A1iicle 23(2) of the ICCPR. Furthermore, the United States case of 
Zablocki v Redhail held that marriage was a fundamental civil right and the most 
important relation in life.
133 Although the New Zealand courts have not taken 
such a strong stance in relation to the right to marry, and there is no equivalent 
right to marry in the NZBORA, these factors illustrate the fundamental 
significance of marriage in Western society. 
( c) Access to civil unions and the availability of choice 
This point is reinforced by the availability of civil umons. Civil umons are 
available to both heterosexual and same-sex couples. 
134 It was thought that 
allowing heterosexuals access to civil unions would eliminate any feeling of 
inferiority because the institution would be inclusive rather than entirely 
separate. 135 It was acknowledged that this could lead to the perception that there 
was a hierarchy of relationships, but the Cabinet Policy Committee considered 
132 Nicholas Bala " Redefining Marriage in Canada and the United States: Moving in the Same 
Direction, But at Different Speeds" (12
th World Conference of the International Society of 
Family Law, Salt Lake City, 19-23 July 2005) 21. 
133 Zablocki v Redhai/ ( 1978) 434 US 374, 3 83-3 84. 
134 Civil Union Act 2004, s 4. 
135 Cabinet Policy Committee "Government Civil Union Bill" ( 13 May 2003) POL (03) 117 
<http://www.justice.govt.nz> (last accessed 20 September 2005). 
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that this could be remedied by creating parallel institutions. 136 However, in its 
1999 report the Law Commission was of the view that any system of registered 
partnership that was an alternative to same-sex marriage should only be available 
to same-sex couples as there is no reason why heterosexuals should be entitled to 
both. It is submitted that this latter argument prevails. Regardless of the form 
and process, the existence of one exclusive and one inclusive institution 
unavoidably suggests a hierarchy. The implication is that the nature of those two 
institutions is not identical, but that the exclusive institution has some sort of 
'special' status. Indeed it suggests that it is the very exclusion of the other group 
that gives it that special status. 
An interrelated issue is that same-sex couples are not entitled to make the 
same choices as heterosexual couples. It is certainly positive that civil unions are 
an inclusive institution, but this should not restrict the choice of same-sex 
couples. The inability to make the choice that heterosexuals are entitled to make 
implies that same-sex couples are not of equal worth. Although some members 
of the gay and lesbian community may find marriage demeaning, this in itself 
does not justify a restriction of choice. This is not necessarily to suggest that 
civil unions would be acceptable if they were only open to same-sex couples, but 
merely to illustrate that the disparity in choice between heterosexual and same-
sex couples underscores the disadvantage suffered by same-sex couples by being 
denied the ability to marry. 
136 Cabinet Policy Committee "Government Civil Union Bill" ( 13 May 2003) POL (03) 117 
<http://www.justice.govt.nz> (last accessed 20 September 2005). 
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VIC'fi RIA U . -RS """Y or- WELLINGTON 
Thus, same-sex couples are still denied the opportunity to participate in a 
fundamental institution of society that has a firmly established position in society 
as the contemporary relationship of highest worth. In this respect, it is difficult 
to dispute that a restriction from entering into a fundamental institution of society 
does not confer a significant disadvantage. Of course, the more severe and 
localised the effect of the law on the affected group, the more likely it is that 
discrimination exists.
137 If mere denial of access to the institution is sufficient to 
persuade, the severity of this exclusion is enhanced by the consequences that 
stem from that exclusion. These consequences in tum increase the value of the 
interest affected. 
(d) The true equivalence ofrights accorded by civil unions 
Although it is true that civil umons accord more or less the same rights as 
marriage, such an absolute assertion is problematic and incorrect. A number of 
incidents can be identified where they do not in fact have exactly the same rights 
as heterosexual couples. Despite the passing of the RSRA there remain in the 
law some discriminatory provisions. It is claimed that these provisions are 
justified because those areas of law will soon be under review or are already part 
of the reform process. 
138 These areas of law are adoption; citizenship; 
guardianship; evidence; friendly societies; insolvency; law practitioners; property; 
wills ; and status of children. 
137 Egan v Canada [ 1995] 2 SCR 513 , 556 (SCC) L' heureux-Dube J dissenting as cited in Law v 
Canada (Minster of Employment and Immigration) [ 1999] I SCR 497, para 74 (SCC) Iacobucci
 
J for the Court. 
138 Civil Union Campaign <http ://www.civilunions.org.nz> (last accessed 2 Aug 2005). 
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Some of these areas of law are not merely incidental to life. Adoption is 
the prime example. Same-sex couples lack the biological ability to have their 
own children, and the inability to adopt severs one of the few options that they 
have to raise children. Although some may argue that it is unhealthy to raise 
children in same-sex relationships, there is evidence to suggest that this is an 
unfounded assertion. 139 It also creates an absurd anomaly in the law in the sense 
that a gay, lesbian or heterosexual individual can adopt a child, but they are 
unable to do that within a committed relationship. 
It is claimed that these distinctions are justifiable because they are under 
review and it may only be a matter of time before they are amended and accord 
civil union partners exactly the same rights as same-sex couples. However this 
outcome is not certain and there is no guarantee that this is going to happen. 
Furthermore, in the meantime same-sex couples are burdened by the exclusion 
from these provisions. If there is an honest intention to accord same-sex couples 
equality with regard to the incidents of marriage, it would have been much more 
convincing to amend the legislation despite it being under review. These 
outstanding provisions highlight the fact that the continued prohibition on same-
sex marriage means that same-sex couples who civilly unite are not 
automatically accorded identical rights as a heterosexual married couple and are 
therefore disadvantaged. 
139 This subject will be discussed in more detail in Part VII: Is the Discrimination Justified? 
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( e) International recognition 
Furthermore, it is common knowledge that same-sex relationships are not 
recognised in any form in the majority of countries around the world. Therefore, 
it is uncertain how different countries will recognise and what status they will 
accord civil unions in their law. By denying same-sex couples admission to 
marriage status, the government is thereby increasing the potential for 
differential and disadvantageous treatment in foreign countries. This has 
certainly been a major concern with the creation of civil unions in the United 
States. Whereas some states have passed legislation to recognise same-sex 
unions, I-to many continue to refuse. Thus, when same-sex couples move states 
they may no longer be entitled to the rights they had in their own state and at no 
stage do they obtain the benefits at federal level. This will no doubt be a major 
concern to both same-sex and heterosexual couples who wish to live overseas. 
However, the impact is obviously greater on same-sex couples who are denied 
the choice to marry. 
Correspondence with actual needs, capacities and circumstances? 
It is true that under the substantive equality model, distinctions drawn 
under the law will not necessarily result in discrimination. Therefore, the 
creation of a separate institution for same-sex couples whilst maintaining the 
distinction under the MA does not automatically give rise to discrimination. For 
instance, a distinction that takes into account the actual differences in 
14° For example New York recognises same-sex marriages from other states, but does not allow 
same-sex marriage or registration of same-sex relationships in any other form. 
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characteristics between individuals in a manner which respects and values their 
dignity and difference will not be discrimination if there is equality as a result of 
the law. 141 It is here that the separate but equal institution in this context 
encounters a logical difficulty. The substantive discrimination model allows for 
distinctions that take into account differences between groups; distinctions 
essentially taking into account the actual needs, capacities or circumstances of 
the claimant group. Thus restricting access to marriage while providing a 
separate institution as an alternative will only be logical and therefore fair and 
dignified if there is a reason that justifies that separate treatment based on a 
difference between heterosexual and same-sex couples. 
(a) The contemporary rationale for having a relationship legally recognised 
Throughout history there have been particular reasons it was important to 
register relationships as a marriage. The passing of property and legitimising 
children are but two examples. However these concerns have now been 
eliminated because most of the law affecting persons and children now applies to 
married and non-married couples. As a result it can be assumed that the primary 
reason for having a relationship legally recognised is about security "tangible" 
validation of their emotional commitment to one another. It is submitted that 
although the individuals in same-sex couples have a different sexual orientation 
to heterosexual couples, the relationship itself is no different and heterosexual 
couples and the purpose of having that relationship formally recognised is no 
different either. As accepted by courts both in the United Kingdom and Canada, 
14 1 law v Canada (Minster of Employment and Immigration) [ 1999] I SCR 497, para 28 (SCC) 
Iacobucci J for the Court. 
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same-sex relationships are capable of being 'conjugal' in nature.
142 Therefore, 
validation of emotional commitment is the common purpose of both same-sex 
and heterosexual couples for having a relationship registered. 
Similar conclusions are reached when the state's interest in the regulation 
of marriage is assessed. The purpose underlying the contemporary state 
regulation of marriage is to provide a structured framework under which couples 
can publicly express their commitment and love to each other and voluntarily 
assume an array of rights and obligations. When that relationship breaks down, 
the law then provides the machinery for an orderly resolution of that situation. 
The public benefits of providing this framework have been outlined in Part IV. 
There is no evidence to suggest that since the state has had the responsibility of 
regulating marriage, there has been any interest in the promotion or 
encouragement of any particular conception of gender roles.
143 Therefore, there 
is nothing separating the interest the state has in regulating marriage and civil 
unions. Thus the creation of a separate institution cannot be defended on the 
grounds of protecting a state interest. 
Procreation remains the most oft argued justification for restricting access 
to marriage. The basis of the argument is that the differential treatment is not 
based on a pre-existing prejudice but rather the biological reality that same-sex 
couples are unable to naturally have their own children. However, as was 
142 Ghaidan v Mendoza [2004] 3 All ER 411 Lord Millet dissenting; M v H [ 1999] 2 SCR 3, para 
58-59 (SCC) Cory J. 
143 
Law Commission of Canada Beyond Conjugality: Recognising and Supporting Close 
Personal Adult Relationships (Ottawa, 2001) 129; Nicholas Bala "Redefining Marriage in 
Canada and the United States: Moving in the Same Direction, But at Different Speeds" ( 12
th 
World Conference of the International Society of Family Law, Salt Lake City, 19-23 July 2005) 4. 
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mentioned in Part V of this paper, procreation has been widely rejected by courts 
as the contemporary purpose of marriage. 144 The reason behind this is that law 
does not require an intention or capability to have children before you may marry, 
and there is no restriction on using contraception within marriage. Furthermore, 
many unmarried couples choose to have children because longer a stigma 
attached to having children outside of marriage. In contemporary society 
mamage means many different things to different people, but in the secular 
nation of New Zealand, the rationale behind mamage 1s companionate as 
opposed to being based on the prescription ofreproduction. 
Other than procreation, perhaps the most significant reason it was deemed 
necessary to have separate treatment is to avoid offending those people that 
consider the traditional concept of marriage to be sacrosanct. 145 The objections 
are asserted on both religious and secular grounds. As outlined in Part II of this 
paper, it was a stated policy objective of the legislation to protect the traditional 
concept of marriage, an objective that was emphasised purposefully by the civil 
union campaign. 146 What is more, at the Select Committee stage there were 
amendments made to the omnibus bill to clarify the different terminology that 
was to be used for marriage and civil unions. 147 Indeed Tim Barnett views the 
creation of civil unions as a win-win situation because they allow for the 
preservation of the traditional concept of marriage as a union between a man and 
144 See for example Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] I NZLR 523 , 572 (CA) Tipping J; Quilter 
v Attorney-General [ 1998] I NZLR 523 , 534 (CA) Thomas J; Halpern v Canada (AG) (2003) 
225 DLR (4 th) 529, para 90 (Ont CA) Blair J; £GALE Canada Inc v Canada (A ttorney General) 
(2003) 13 BCLR (4 th) 1, para 88 (CA) Prowse JA. 
145 See for example New Zealand Law Commission Recognising Same-Sex Relationships (NZLC 
SP4, Wellington, 1999) 6. 
146 Civil Union Campaign <http://www.civilunions .org.nz> (last accessed 2 Aug 2005). 
147 Justice and Electoral Select Committee " Relationships (Statutory References) Bill" (I March 
2005) 3-4 <www.clerk.parliament.govt.nz> (last accessed 28 September 2005). 
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a woman, while at the same time giving recognition that same-sex couples can 
h 1 d · h · h · 148
 
s are a ove an commitment t at 1s wort protecting. 
(b) Religious Objections 
There are many that oppose same-sex marriage on religious grounds, asserting 
that the natural order of families is based on the union between a man and a 
woman and that this union is the cornerstone of society. It is not possible to 
generalise in regard to views held by Christians as there are some that believe 
homosexuality 1s fundamentally wrong, others that do not condemn 
homosexuality entirely but do consider that the traditional concept of marriage 
should be preserved, and others that would support same-sex marriage. 
Nonetheless, religious opposition to same-sex marriage is represented strongly in 
the submissions to the CUA and RSRA, seeing civil unions as no more than 
• 149 
same-sex marriage. 
However, marnage 1s a secular institution in New Zealand, legally 
detached from the Church (except for the privileged position of clergy as 
marriage celebrants) and clearly regulated by the state alone. A valid marriage 
only necessitates civil requirements to be met, there being no requirement that 
couples getting married partake in any sort ofreligious ceremony. Therefore, the 
institution of marriage is no longer entangled with ideas of morality associated 
with the Church. It is therefore unfair to restrict access to a fundamental 
148 Tim Barnett (9 December 2004) 622 NZPD l 7643-17644. 
149 See Alison Laurie Report on the Written Submissions to the Justice and Electoral Select 
Committee on the Civil Union Bill and Relationships (Statutory References) Bill (Wellington, 
November 2004) 4-5. 
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institution of society founded on an objection that is redundant under the 
contemporary status of the institution. In a secular society, legislation based on 
religious law is unacceptable. 150 It only encourages religious intolerance, 
condemning an integral and essential aspect of the lives of gays and lesbians. 
More compelling is the argument that same-sex marriage infringes the 
right to freedom of religion protected by section 15 of the NZBORA. This 
argument could be advanced on three grounds- that same-sex marriage imposes a 
dominant social ethos that will limit the freedom to hold conflicting religious 
beliefs; that it may require religious officials to perform same-sex marriages; and 
that it will create a rights conflict in areas other than the solemnisation of 
marriage. 151 The first ground is essentially an assertion that the conferral of a 
right on one group infringes the right of another, essentially amounting to an 
equality argument. Such an argument cannot succeed as legislation permitting 
same-sex mamage would not impose a burden on any differential basis. 152 
Although this may be the core of religious opposition, provision of same-sex 
marriage would not disallow individuals to manifest their beliefs personally. 
The final ground of opposition is a matter that must be determined on the 
facts of actual conflict. Where a conflict has not been made out, then no conflict 
can be said to exist. Therefore, until legislation has been implemented alleged 
150 Alison Laurie Report on the Written Submissions to the Justice and Electoral Select 
Committee on the Civil Union Bill and Relationships (Statutory References) Bill (Wellington, 
November 2004) 2; Mark Strasser "The Logical Case for Same-Sex Marriage: A Response to 
Professor John Witte Jr" in Lynne D Wardle and others (eds) Marriage and Same-Sex Unions: A 
Debate (Praeger Publishers, Westport, 2003) 60, 62. 
151 For examples of where this might occur see Anthony R Picarello "Other Rights at Stake in the 
Debate over Same-Sex Marriage" (2004) New Jersey Law Journal. 
152 See Reference Re Same-Sex Marriage (2004) SCR 79, paras 45 and 48 (SCC). 
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conflicts of rights are only in the abstract, and it is thus improper to assess if 
there would be an unacceptable conflict ofrights in undefined spheres.
153 
However, in relation to the second complaint there is an identifiable 
conflict. If religious officials were compelled to solemnise same-sex marriages 
against their wishes, it would be in breach of their right to manifest their re! igion. 
The Supreme Court of Canada found that if legislation compelled religious 
officials to perform same-sex unions, this would certainly be in breach of the 
Charter protection of religious freedom. However, there was no compulsion in 
the law and the Court found that the Charter protection was broad enough to 
prevent religious officials from being forced to perform civil or religious 
marriages contrary to their beliefs. 
154 It is submitted that the NZBORA 
protection would equally prevent religious officials from compulsion, and in any 
case the potential conflict could easily be addressed with the inclusion of a 
conscience clause in any marriage amendment that did not require religious 
officials to solemnise unions against their beliefs. 
(c) Secular Objections 
In addition to religious objections, secular arguments are advanced in opposition 
to same-sex marriage. The greatest secular objection to same-sex marriage is 
that it poses a threat to family and the moral state of society.
155 Implicit in this 
argument is the suggestion that marriage loses its value to society if it is 
153 See Reference Re Same-Sex Marriage (2004) SCR 79, para 51 (SCC). 
154 See Ref erence Re Same-Sex Marriage (2004) SCR 79, para 60 (SCC). 
155 Nicholas Bala " Redefining Marriage in Canada and the United States: Moving in the Same 
Direction, But at Different Speeds" (12
th World Conference of the International Society of 
Family Law, Salt Lake City, 19-23 July 2005) 9. 
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something to which same-sex couples have access, as if the only thing that gives 
marnage its value is that a certain group of society has been precluded from 
enjoying it. 156 As has been illustrated above, formally registered same-sex 
relationships offer precisely the same benefits to family units and society. 
Therefore, this argument only serves to illustrate that conservative objections 
such as these are largely rooted in the stereotypical assumption that same-sex 
relationships do not deserving equal concern and respect because homosexuality 
is inherently morally wrong. 
Finally and most fundamentally, in any event arguments based on need, 
capacity or circumstances must be made from the perspective of the claimant. 157 
In any case, the fact that legislation may achieve a valid social purpose for one 
group cannot be used to deny an equality claim where the effect of that 
legislation conflicts with the purpose of the equality guarantee. 158 Thus, aside 
from the freedom of religion tension which it would be possible to remedy, all 
the above arguments would fail because they are not based on the need, capacity 
or circumstances of the complainant group. This contextual factor therefore 
provides a strong indication that civil unions do not remedy the affront to dignity 
under the MA. 
156 Mark Strasser "The Logical Case for Same-Sex Marriage: A Response to Professor John Witte 
Jr" in Lynne D Wardle and others (eds) Marriage and Same-Sex Unions: A Debate (Praeger 
Publishers, Westport, 2003) 60, 62. 
157 Halpern v Canada (AG) (2003) 225 DLR (4 th) 529, para 186 (Ont CA). 
158 law v Canada (Minster of Employment and Immigration) [ 1999] I SCR 497, para 70 (SCC) 
Iacobucci J for the Court. 
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5 Ameliorative purpose 
This contextual factor involves an inquiry as to whether the impugned legislation 
has an ameliorative purpose or effect on a more disadvantaged group in society. 
Iacobucci J stressed that this factor will only be relevant where the person or 
group that is excluded from the scope of the ameliorative legislation are more 
advantaged in a relative sense.
159 It is submitted that there is no evidence that the 
restriction on marriage serves any ameliorative purpose for heterosexual couples, 
particularly in light of the fact that same-sex couples are the historically 
d. d d . h" IW 1sa vantage group m t 1s context. 
6 The nature and extent of the burden 
As illustrated above, it cannot be denied that the effect of the CUA is to "fence 
off' same-sex couples purely on the basis of their sexual orientation and in the 
absence of need. 161 The seminal case of Brown v Board of Education
162 in the 
Supreme Court of the United States provides an analogous example of the effects 
of equal but separate treatment that is based purely on personal characteristics. 
The Court in Brown overruled Plessy v Ferguson
163
, a case that established the 
separate but equal doctrine under which equality of treatment is accorded when 
159 Law v Canada (Minster of Employment and Immigration) [1999] I SCR 497, para 72 (SCC) 
Iacobucci J for the Court. 
160 law v Canada (Minster of Employment and Immigration) [1999] I SCR 497, para 72 (SCC) 
Iacobucci J for the Court. 
161 David Buckel "Government fixes a label of inferiority on Same-Sex Couples When It Imposes 
Civil Unions and Denies Access to Marriage" (2005) 16 Stan L & Pol'y Rev 73, 74. 
162 Brown v Board of Education (1954) 347 US 483. 
163 Plessy v Ferguson (1896) 163 US 537. 
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substantially equal facilities are provided to the two groups in question, even 
though these facilities are separate. 164 
In Brown Warren CJ renounced the separate but equal doctrine in the 
field of public education. At the root of his decision was a consideration of the 
effect of segregation itself on public education. His Honour emphasised the 
importance of education to democratic society, deeming it the very foundation of 
good citizenship. It was concluded that separation of educational facilities solely 
because of race generated " ... a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the 
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be 
undone" .165 In relation to the effect on their educational facilities it was said that 
a sense of inferiority affects the motivation of the child to learn and thus may 
have detrimental affects on the educational and mental development of black 
children. 166 
A number of similarities can be drawn between these two situations. The 
fundamental importance of education to society is analogous to the fundamental 
private and public importance of official relationship recognition that encourages 
stable and committed relationships. Brown supports the proposition that separate 
treatment of same-sex couples, even if it accords the equivalent rights, is unfair 
and denigrates their relationships if there is no legitimate need for the separate 
treatment. If there is no need for the separation of res·ources in these 
circumstances, it must necessarily follow that the motivation behind the 
separation is founded on prejudice and therefore perpetuates a sense of inferiority. 
164 Brown v Board of Education ( 1954) 347 US 483, 488 . 
165 Brown v Board of Education ( 1954) 347 US 483 , 494. 
166 Brown v Board of Education (1954) 347 US 483,494. 
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Notwithstanding the obvious benefits that same-sex couples receive as a 
result of civil unions, it is possible to go so far as to argue that the deliberate 
fencing off of same-sex couples actually exacerbates the original affront to 
dignity. The passage of legislation by the government that not only allows, but 
expressly legitimises the separate treatment of same-sex couples compounds the 
feeling that their relationships are not equally valued by society. That is to say, 
the considered choice of language reflects the assigning of same-sex couples to a 
second-class status. 167 Moreover, when this inferior status has the sanction of the 
law, the consequences are even greater as it sends a message to society inviting 
further bias and discrimination. 
168 
D Conclusion 
Gays and lesbians have been subjected to historical disadvantage, this being a 
strong though not determinative indicator of discrimination. 
169 The interest in 
question is a time tested institution that has a status incomparable to any other, 
access to which allows individuals and couples complete participation in society. 
Maintained restriction on access to that institution means that same-sex couples 
suffer additional disadvantaged because civil unions do not automatically confer 
precisely identical benefits to marriage. Furthermore, the creation of civil unions 
in the context of a continued restriction on marriage is not at all related to the 
167 In re Opinion of the Justices: SJC-09 I 63 [2003] 440 Mass 1201, 1207 (Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts) Marshall J . 
168 David Buckel "Government fixes a label of inferiority on Same-Sex Couples When It Imposes 
Civil Unions and Denies Access to Marriage" (2005) 16 Stan L & Pol ' y Rev 73, 75 . 
169 law v Canada (Minster of Employment and Immigration) [ 1999] I SCR 497, para 88 (SCC) 
Iacobucci J for the Court. 
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needs and capacities of same-sex couples, nor does it serve any ameliorative 
purpose. Rather, it 1s based purely on a pre-existing prejudice which is 
ultimately rooted in an adversity to homosexuality. It has been illustrated that on 
consideration of the contextual factors from Law the provision of a separate but 
equal institution therefore does not remedy the affront to dignity caused by the 
distinction under the MA. In fact , it may even be seen as exacerbating the 
discrimination given that the CUA represents a conscious decision on the part of 
the government to "fence off' same-sex couples. Therefore, there remains prima 
facie discrimination under the MA. 
VII IS THE DISCRIMINATION JUSTIFIED? 
A Section 5 of the NZBORA 
Section 5 of the NZBORA provides that: 
Subject to section 4 of this Bill of Rights, the rights and freedoms contained in 
this Bill of Rights may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by 
law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
This means that when it has been determined that there has been a prima facie 
breach of a right that is protected it must then be considered whether it can be 
justified. The justification for a piece of legislation may be established by the 
practical, moral economic or social underpinnings of the legislation in 
question. 170 This part of the paper considers and discusses the possibility of 
170 Halpern v Canada (AG) (2003) 225 DLR (4th) 529, para 186 (Ont CA). 
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advancing an argument that the social underpinning of the MA is the protection 
of children, justifying the continued prohibition on same-sex marriage. 
In terms of the requirements under section 5 of the NZBORA, the limit in 
the MA is prescribed by law as it is created by a distinction that is drawn under 
legislation. However, whether or not the limitation is demonstrably justified in a 
free and democratic society entails more in depth consideration. The case of 
Moonen v Film & Literature Board of Review 
171 established the test that is 
applied in New Zealand to determine whether or not a particular limitation can 
be justified in a free and democratic society. The Moonen test was derived from 
the Canadian test applied in relation to section 1 of the Charter which is the 
equivalent of the NZBORA' s section 5. Thus, for the purpose of consistency, the 
Canadian test formulated in the case of Oakes
172 will be used as the reference 
point in the section 5 analysis. 
Under the Oakes test, 173 the party seeking to uphold the impugned law 
has the burden of proving on the balance of probabilities that: 
(a) The objective of the law is pressing and substantial; 
(b) The means chosen to achieve the objective are reasonable and demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society. This requires: 
a. The rights violation to be rationally connected to the objective of 
the law; 
b. The impugned law to minimally impair the Charter guarantee; and 
111 Moonen v Film & literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9 (CA). 
172 R v Oakes [ 1986] l SCR I 03 (SCC). 
113 R v Oakes [ I 986] I SCR I 03, 13 8-13 (SCC) 9 Dickson CJ. 
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c. Proportionality between the effect of the law and its objective so 
that the attainment of the objective is not outweighed by the 
abridgement of the right. 
According to the Ministry of Justice, the assertion that the limitation is 
demonstrably justified requires justifying the law with evidence such as research, 
empirical data, findings from consultations, reports or results from inquiries or 
reviews. That is to say, it must be based on high quality analysis and research 
that firmly establishes why a particular course of action is necessary. 174 
B Pressing and Substantial Objective 
1 What is the objective? 
The first step in this analysis is to identify the objective of the law, and then 
determine whether that objective is pressing and substantive enough to justify the 
limitation on the right. The existence of two institutions that essentially perform 
the same legal function opens the door to the argument that the MA must have 
some other primary objective other than formal registration of relationships 
accompanied by both the social and legal benefits. Although procreation has 
been rejected as the objective of marriage, there is potential to argue that the 
protection of children is the objective behind the MA and is an objective that 
justifies maintaining marriage as an exclusively heterosexual union. It is 
submitted that this is the only possible objective that warrants thorough 
discussion. 
174 Ministry of Justice The Non-Discrimination Standards of the Government and the Public 
Sector: Guidelines on How to Apply these Standards and Who is Covered (Wellington, 2002) 22 
<http://www.justice.govt.nz> (last accessed 25 September 2005). 
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2 Is it pressing and substantial? 
The argument is that conventional maJTiage has served us well as the 
principal framework for relationships and for the nurture of children so the state 
should not encourage people to raise children outside of this context. Although 
there are some heterosexual and same-sex couples who chose to raise children 
outside of the marriage institution, these situations are exceptional. 
175 
Heterosexual marriage is the most natural and likely place for children to be 
conceived and raised and provides the best environment for raising children.
176 
Moreover, as marriage is seen by many as essentially a licence to raise a 
family, 177 maintaining the restriction on same-sex marriage, in spite of civil 
unions, serves to reinforce the message that same-sex relationships are not a 
desirable. 
Proponents of this view look to social science research for support 
argumg that research affirms that conventional mamage is good for society 
because it provides children with the care, nurturing and moral education 
necessary to become good citizens, ultimately helping them to become good 
citizens. 178 It is said that the reason that conventional marriage is the ideal 
situation for familial relationships is because the union of two persons of the 
opposite sex creates something unique, a special relationship of vast potential 
175 Egan v Canada [1995] 2 SCR 513, para 26 (SCC) La Forest J. 
176 Lynne D Wardle "Conference on Marriage, Families and Democracy: The Bonds of 
Matrimony and the Bonds of Constitutional Democracy" (2003) 32 Hofstra L Rev 349, 369. 
177 
EJ Graff What is Marriage for? (Beacon Press, Boston, 1999) 117. 
178 Lynne D Wardle "Conference on Marriage, Families and Democracy: The Bonds of 
Matrimony and the Bonds of Constitutional Democracy" (2003) 32 Hofstra L Rev 349, 386. 
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value to society. 179 Furthermore, it provides the profound benefits of dual-
gender parenting- a model for inter-gender relations; 180 the ability to show 
children how to relate to members of the same and opposite sex; 181 the 
1 . f b h 1 d £ 1 · 1 182 h · comp ementanty o ot ma e an ema e parenting sty es; t e umque 
contribution of the father; 183 male and female contributions to linguistic 
development; 184 and so on. 
There were many submitters that actually advanced this argument in 
opposition to the CUA. 1344 of the submissions supported the view that children 
needed to be raised by their biological parents and this was not optional. 185 The 
vehement opposition expressed in relation to civil unions on this matter can 
probably be explained by the fact that many submitters conflated the institutions, 
referring to same-sex civil unions as same-sex marriage. It is assumed that this 
vehement opposition to the CUA was similarly motivated by the belief that civil 
unions, being equivalent in nature, would themselves undermine the preference 
for raising children within conventional heterosexual marriage. 
179 Lynne D Wardle "Conference on Marriage, Families and Democracy: The Bonds of 
Matrimony and the Bonds of Constitutional Democracy" (2003) 32 Hofstra L Rev 349,373. 
180 Lynne D Wardle "Conference on Marriage, Families and Democracy: The Bonds of 
Matrimony and the Bonds of Constitutional Democracy" (2003) 32 Hofstra L Rev 349,375. 
181 Lynne D Wardle "Conference on Marriage, Families and Democracy: The Bonds of 
Matrimony and the Bonds of Constitutional Democracy" (2003) 32 Hofstra L Rev 349, 373. 
182 Dean A Byrd and Kristen M Byrd "Dual Gender Parenting: A Social Science Perspective for 
Optimal Child Rearing" (Ith World Conference of the International Society of Family Law, Salt 
Lake City, 19-23 July 2005) 5. 
183 Dean A Byrd and Kristen M Byrd " Dual Gender Parenting: A Social Science Perspective for 
Optimal Child Rearing" (12tl' World Conference of the International Society of Family Law, Salt 
Lake City, 19-23 July2005)69-13. 
184 Dean A Byrd and Kristen M Byrd "Dual Gender Parenting: A Social Science Perspective for 
Optimal Child Rearing" ( 12th World Conference of the International Society of Family Law, Salt 
Lake City, 19-23 July 2005) 7. 
185 Alison Laurie Report on the Written Submissions to the Justice and Electoral Select 
Committee on the Civil Union Bill and Relationships (Statutory References) Bill (Wellington, 
November 2004) 6. 
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As required by the Ministry of Justice, there must be high quality 
. l h . 186 M evidence produced to establish why a part1cu ar pat 1s necessary. any 
studies have been conducted but they are not always conclusive because of 
theoretical or methodological deficiencies. Samples are frequently limited or not 
chosen at random. 187 However, there is a growing consensus in social sciences is 
that same-sex couples are just as fit and able to raise children as heterosexual 
couples. Moreover, there is no evidence to show that children suffer behavioural 
or developmental disturbances due to the sexual orientation of their parents. 188 
Same-sex couples may raise children differently, but different does not 
necessarily mean worse .189 The greatest concern is that children raised in same-
sex relationships may be stigmatised. 190 However, this stigmatisation would 
arise from the fact that children are being raised in a same-sex relationship full 
stop. If those same-sex relationships were offered and accepted the option to 
marry, it is likely that this equal treatment under the law would in tum alleviate 
the social prejudice to which these children were subjected. 
186 
Ministry of Justice The Non-Discrimination Standards of the Government and the Public 
Sector: Guidelines on How to Apply these Standards and Who is Covered (Wellington, 2002) 22 
<http://www.j ustice.govt.n z> (last accessed 25 September 2005). 187 
Nina Dethloff "Same-sex Couples as Parents" (Ith World Conference of the International 
Society of Family Law, Salt Lake City, 19-23 July 2005) 5. 188 
Nina Dethloff "Same-sex Couples as Parents" (Ith World Conference of the International 
Society of Family Law, Salt Lake City, 19-23 July 2005) 5; Nicholas Bala " Redefining Marriage 
in Canada and the United States: Moving in the Same Direction, But at Different Speeds" ( 12th 
World Conference of the International Society of Family Law, Salt Lake City, l 9-23 July 2005) 
l O; See also the report issued by the Committee on Psychological Aspects of Child and Family 
Health, Ellen C Perrin and others Technical Report: Coparent or Second-Parent Adoption by 
Same-Sex Parents l 09 PEDIATR!CS 34 I (2002). 
189 
For example Carlos Ball argues that any perceived problems with same-sex parenting truly lie 
not with the parenting of lesbians and gay men but with normative positions, based on the 
stereotypical understandings of gender roles that are used to evaluate and assess the effects of that 
parenting; Carlos A Ball " Lesbian and Gay Families: Gender Nonconformity and the 
Implications of Difference" (2003) 31 Cap U L Rev 691 . 
190 
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C Conclusion 
Therefore, in the absence of cogent evidence that conve
ntional 
heterosexual marriage is the most ideal environment in which to
 raise children, 
the protection of children cannot be seen as the pressing and subst
antial objective 
for continuing the restriction on marriage. In any case, in light o
f the increasing 
percentage of children being conceived and raised in same-sex rela
tionships, 
191 it 
is submitted that there is not rational connection between the lim
itation on the 
right and the objective. There is no indication that the restrictio
n on marriage 
will effectively alter the ever increasing trend of children being r
aised by same-
sex couples. One of the motivations behind civil unions was to p
rovide a stable 
environment in which to raise children, and it is likely that the C
UA (as argued 
by many opponents to the bill) will in fact encourage same-sex par
entage. 
VIII CONCLUSION 
With the enactment of the CUA and the RSRA, the New Zealan
d government 
purported to be satisfying its human rights obligations under sec
tion 19 of the 
NZBORA. It was not alone in this view, with many of the country
's constituents 
supporting the legislation on the basis that it finally accorded sam
e-sex couples 
with the equality they deserved. However it has been illustrated 
that in light of 
overseas developments, Quilter no longer provides a satisfactory 
backdrop for 
the formulation of separate but equal legislation. The issue r
equires a full 
analysis which does not rely on Quilter as a starting point in o
rder to truly 
191 Mv H [l 999] 2 SCR 3, para 75 (SCC) Iacobucci J. 
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determine whether or not the law is adequately protecting the self-worth of same-
sex couples. 
It is submitted that under a full analysis, civil unions do not remedy the 
discrimination suffered by same-sex couples by virtue of the distinction under 
the MA, and therefore fail to meet the policy objective of fulfilling human rights 
imperatives. The primary reason for this is that they remain excluded from a 
fundamental institution of society that symbolises the highest representation of 
self-worth, in the absence of a valid reason for doing so. Same-sex couples have 
been historically subject to unfair treatment in society due to their sexual 
orientation, and further differential treatment only serves to reinforce the stigma 
of inferiority imposed on their relationships. As stated by McIntyre J in Andre,ws, 
discrimination that is reinforced by the law is particularly repugnant as it 
contributes to the perpetuation or promotion of their unfair social 
characterisation. 192 
The necessary implication of this conclusion is that civil unions are an 
inadequate alternative to same-sex marriage because they do not ensure the 
preservation of the dignity of same-sex couples. Therefore, the MA should be 
amended and provision made for same-sex couples to marry. This would finally 
accord same-sex relationships with the concern and respect and would provide 
concomitant benefits for society by advancing important social policy objectives. 
192 Andrews v law Society of British Columbia [ 1989) I SCR 143, 172 (SCC) McIntyre J. 
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